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 2 
Introduction 
At the end of August 1934, during a meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the 
White House, Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, suddenly whispered to his 
assistant Marriner Stoddard Eccles, ”Marriner, I’ve been talking to the President about 
your filling Eugene Black’s place.”1 Two months earlier, in June, Eugene Black had 
tendered his resignation as governor of the Federal Reserve Board. When, in September, 
the President formally asked Eccles if he was interested in the job, he answered that he 
would accept only if the Federal Reserve System underwent fundamental changes. 
President Roosevelt accepted and announced Eccles’s appointment.  
 That was the beginning of a seventeen-year long government career of a Mormon 
from Ogden, Utah, a Republican banker, entrepreneur and the owner of a variety of 
businesses. In the years before 1940, Eccles was the highest-ranking member of the 
Federal Government to advocate and ultimately convince President Roosevelt to adopt a 
fiscal policy based on principles, which strongly resembled the principles elaborated by 
British economist John Maynard Keynes in his book General Theory of Employment, 
Interest, and Money. These principles would continue to influence US fiscal policy for 
several decades after 1945. How Eccles became a true Keynesian “deficit spender” and 
how he battled for acknowledgment of his views is the first subject of this thesis. Eccles 
would reorganize the Federal Reserve System, paving the road for the powerful 
institution the System is today. Why and how he did this, is the second topic of this thesis. 
 Already in 1932, Eccles was convinced that only government action could solve 
the economic problems caused by the Depression, which had started in 1929. However, it 
was only in 1934 that he concluded that the Federal Reserve System needed 
reconstruction. As a monetary mechanism, the System had clearly failed. The 1913 
design of the System – an arrangement between private and public interests – had lost its 
balance. It now served only private interests. The Board in Washington was powerless. 
Most economic historians and economists today agree with Eccles’s assessment that the 
System was a failure in 1929-1933. Milton Friedman and John Kenneth Galbraith may 
differ on nearly every economic issue, but they agree that the Federal Reserve System did 
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too little to prevent the Crash of October 1929, and the following Depression or, when it 
did act, its decisions deepened the Depression.          
 When Eccles became governor of the Federal Reserve Board, his views on how to 
solve the economic crisis were clear. After the crash of 1929, he developed what he 
called his “logical radicalism.” As a banker in Utah, he saw the consequences of the 
Depression in the West. His views were later characterized as “Keynesian,” but Eccles 
always denied the influence of Keynes, even when he did not deny there were analogies. 
Just like Keynes, he believed that the root cause of the Depression was under-
consumption or, as Keynes called it, demand failure. Under-consumption was the cause 
of unemployment, and to Eccles this was not only an economic, but also even more so, a 
moral problem. The solution had to come from the federal government through high 
expenditures. Moreover, to prevent future depressions, the government had to play an 
activist role in the economy. Although neither Eccles nor his biographer Sydney Hyman 
writes about it, the most probable explanation for Eccles’s vision was his Mormon 
background. In Mormon society, direction of the economy by the government – meaning 
the Mormon Church – was common. Also common among Mormons was that the same 
government provided public works jobs to the unemployed in difficult times.         
 The first time Eccles drew national attention for his views, was in February 1933, 
when he testified before the Senate Finance Committee. This committee was 
investigating the economic problems of the United States in order to suggest solutions. In 
contrast to other witnesses, who argued that the government should “balance the budget,” 
and spend only what it received for the national economy to recover automatically, 
Eccles stressed that intervention on the part of the government was the cure. Government 
spending would stimulate consumption, he said. Under-consumption and unemployment 
would disappear. Nearly unanimous skepticism and disbelief were the reactions of the 
members of the Senate Finance Committee to Eccles’s proposals.2 
 After testifying, Eccles met Rexford Tugwell, one of the President Roosevelt’s 
“braintrusters.” This meeting led to the invitation to Eccles to become a member of the 
Roosevelt Administration. In January 1934, Secretary of the Treasury, Henry 
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Morgenthau, appointed Eccles Assistant on Monetary and Credit Matters. Later that year, 
President Roosevelt nominated him governor of the Federal Reserve Board.  
 Eccles would serve as governor, chair and member of the Federal Reserve Board 
from 1934 until 1951. His major achievement as head of the Federal Reserve System was 
the Banking Act of 1935, which reformed the Federal Reserve System, although the 
major impact of the reforms had to wait until after the Second World War.   
 Although monetary policy was his main responsibility, his principal concern was 
fiscal policy. According to Eccles only fiscal measures, using the budget of the 
government, not monetary policy, controlling the supply of money, could provide a 
solution to the economic crisis of the 1930s. On fiscal policy, he permanently battled with 
Henry Morgenthau, who, as Secretary of the Treasury, was the man in charge of fiscal 
policy, and had an “obsessive commitment to a balanced budget.”3 Until the “Roosevelt 
Recession” of 1937, Morgenthau had the President’s ear to a much greater extent than did 
Eccles. Morgenthau outranked Eccles and was an old family friend of the Roosevelts. 
Moreover Roosevelt also was, albeit more instinctively, for a balanced budget. In the end, 
Eccles triumphed. After 1937, for the first time, the President submitted a budget based 
on deficit spending principles. Eccles’s views and the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 are the 
reasons that, in the words of Alan Meltzer, the Federal Reserve System was “in the 
backseat” of the car driving policy action from 1934 until 1951.4   
 Utilizing both primary and secondary sources, this thesis will discuss the “logical 
radical” views that Eccles developed after 1929. Eccles’s papers and his autobiography, 
Beckoning Frontiers, are a major source of information. Attention is given to his opinion 
that, after 1929, the Federal Reserve System had not acted in a way to stave off the crisis. 
On that, Eccles is not alone. Historians and economists like Milton Friedman, Herbert 
Stein, Alan Meltzer and John Kenneth Galbraith share this opinion, although they differ 
on the causes of that failure. May be also betraying the bias of a westerner, Eccles is not 
unique in his opinion that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York specifically was the 
main culprit. 
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 An intriguing question is why two budget-balancers, Henry Morgenthau and 
Franklin Roosevelt, knowing the views of Eccles, nominated and appointed him anyway 
to lead the Federal Reserve Board. Why did they allow a deficit spender to reconstruct 
the Federal Reserve System through the Banking Act of 1935? How did that Act reflect 
the changes which Eccles had proposed to President Roosevelt?  Why did the System 
play a minor role after the reorganization?  
 The Banking Act of 1935 put Eccles in a powerful position. He became in that 
position the government’s most powerful spokesman for what Alan Brinkley called “the 
fiscal liberals,” the spending wing of the New Deal and Dean May “the generally 
recognized ideologue of the New Deal spenders.”5 Eccles received indispensable support 
from Laughlin Currie, a professional economist from Harvard and a “pre-Keynesian” as 
well. Together they made proposals and criticized proposals that smelled of a balanced 
budget. In 1938, when the recession of 1937 persuaded President Roosevelt to submit a 
budget based on the Eccles’s views, Eccles and Currie triumphed over the budget 
balancers, for the time being or was it a Pyrrhic victory?  
 The thesis concludes with a discussion of Eccles’s legacy. He paved the road for 
the powerful, independent central banking institution that the Federal Reserve System is 
today, too powerful in the eyes of some, who call it “the Fourth Branch” or “a Sacred 
Temple.”6 Eccles introduced new, and at that time even heretical, ideas on fiscal policy to 
the government of the United States. Those ideas would influence US fiscal policy for 
many years in such a way that President Richard Nixon is alleged to have said in 
1971,”We are all Keynesians now.” 
 
Chapter 1. The “logical radical” views of Marriner S. Eccles 
“In the mad confusion and fear brought about by our disordered economy we need … 
more than at any other time in our history … a new economic philosophy and … changes 
in our social system. The nineteenth century economics will no longer serve our purpose; 
an economic age 150 years old has come to an end. The orthodox capitalistic system of 
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uncontrolled individualism with its free competition will no longer serve our purpose. We 
must think in terms of the scientific, technological, interdependent machine age, which 
can only survive and function under a modified capitalistic system controlled and 
regulated from the top by government.”7 
 With this credo, Marriner Eccles started his testimony before the Senate Finance 
Committee on February 24, 1933. Since these ideas came from a self-declared 
conservative Republican, a millionaire businessman and banker from the West, it was no 
wonder the Senators were baffled to hear the American, laissez faire, free enterprise 
system declared obsolete. Perhaps it was even more surprising to hear that only the 
government could and should regulate and control the economy. It was a heavy blow to 
the Jeffersonian ideal of the minimalist role of government.   
 The worldview Eccles rejected as a result of experiencing the Depression was the 
classic orthodox view he inherited from his father David. David Eccles migrated from 
Scotland in 1863 where his family had converted to Mormonism. He became a self-made 
millionaire entrepreneur in Ogden, Utah. When he died in 1912, he owned or participated 
in more than twenty, very different companies, ranging from lumber and sugar to 
construction and transport. His estate amounted to more than $7 million. David left 2 
wives and 21 children. Marriner was the eldest son of David and his second wife, Ellen. 
Without a will, according to Utah law, David’s estate went to his first wife and her 
children. However, David had given Ellen and her children stock in some of his 
companies. Refusing to pool their stock into one common holding company with David’s 
first wife and her children, Marriner and Ellen established a separate holding company to 
manage their stock, the Eccles Investment Company. That company became the basis of 
the string of businesses of which Marriner was president, vice-president, director or 
treasurer, a fact he mentioned 20 years later before the Senate Finance Committee.
8
 
 David Eccles believed that in a system of free enterprise everybody could achieve 
what he had achieved if they were thrifty and worked hard. He felt the government had 
no place in the economic system. Its only role was to keep its expenses in balance with its 
revenues. He thought that a budget in balance would promote confidence and stimulate 
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savings, thus forming capital with which to invest in further productive enterprises. David 
Eccles himself never used capital formed from savings by others. Early in his career, he 
decided never to be dependent on others. Therefore, he never borrowed money, and 
unlike other Western businessmen, he never looked East for capital. He extended his 
business empire through reinvesting the profits he made. Nevertheless, this attitude, 
which, as Marriner writes in his memoirs, would have made banks superfluous, prevented 
David not from having any interest in banks. Of course, David saw the misery of the 
panics and depressions of the second half of the nineteenth century. However, he viewed 
them as natural, purgatory self-corrections of the economic system. Charitable 
institutions such as David’s own Mormon Church should take care of persons in need.9 
 The first position Marriner Eccles mentioned to the Senate Finance Committee in 
February 1933 was his role as President of the First Security Corporation. It was the 
flagship of his fleet of sugar, milk, lumber and construction enterprises. At the time, his 
Utah Construction Company was the leading company of the six that were building the 
Boulder Dam. Eccles founded First Security in 1928. During the year after the death of 
his father in 1912, in addition to the interests in the banks he inherited from his father, he 
started to acquire more banks, not only in Utah but also in Idaho. In 1920, exchanging 
stock with the children of David’s first wife, Eccles obtained a controlling interest in two 
banks in Salt Lake City. By the time he was thirty, his banking business was the largest in 
Salt Lake City and one of the largest in the state of Utah.
10
 
 After 1920, Eccles acquired more banks and by 1928, Eccles Investment owned 
17 banks. They all operated autonomously and therefore were not very cost-efficient. 
Sharing of some functions such as auditing, advertising and credit inspections was seen 
as a cost cutting measure. To justify a separate organization to provide these services, a 
sufficiently large scale was required. Eccles estimated it would take between 15 to 20 
banks to provide that scale. The problem was, however, how to set up an organization 
that would not violate the National Bank Act of 1863. At that time, the consensus 
interpreted that act as prohibiting interstate branch banking. Therefore, a straightforward 
merger of his banks into one organization was not possible. The device Eccles chose 
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instead was the holding company. He was the first to apply this form of organization to 
the banking business. In June 1928, each of the shareholders of the Eccles-banks 
exchanged his shares for shares of a new holding company, named First Security 
Corporation, an entity incorporated according to the laws of Delaware. This holding 
company, itself not a bank, became sole owner of the Eccles-banks. These banks, each 
having a charter, a president and directors, nominally remained independent and 
autonomous. In practice, however, the holding company managed and guided them. With 
this innovation, Eccles had found a way to circumvent a weakness of the American 
banking system, a weakness that became clear during the Depression. Within a year, 11 
other banks in Utah and Idaho joined the group and deposits doubled.
11
 
 As Hyman observes, “in 1929, at the age of thirty-eight, (Eccles) could see how 
his own rise in the business world affirmed the truths and precepts he had received from 
his father … concerning work, thrift, production, self-reliance … an economic system 
functioning along laissez-faire lines.” Eccles really believed America’s economy was 
sound and that depressions and panics were outdated. The consumer-price index was 
declining. Federal income exceeded expenses. Taxes were low and corporate profits were 
rising. The economic system was free of government interference.
12
  
 In 1925, Eccles demonstrated his belief in this view, when, as new president of 
the Utah Bankers Association, he paid tribute to his father by saying, ”progress comes 
only through toil, economy and thrift and that these alone are the active power which 
creates the enduring structure.” In this speech, he also warned his listeners to forget 
“some of the extravagant desires born of the war conditions if we are to continue the 
steady march of progress.” In the light of his later views, the use of the word “extravagant” 
was remarkable. Also remarkable for a Mid-West banker, was the breadth of his views. 
He welcomed the election of Hindenburg as President of Germany; he praised Great 
Britain and other countries, for instance Holland, for reestablishing the gold standard. He 
forgave Great Britain for not having balanced its budget for five years, because it had 
reduced its indebtedness. Eccles did not evaluate the achievements of the financial 
system, created by the Federal Reserve Act ten years earlier, except to mention the 
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growth of deposits and the increase in the stock of gold.
13
 At that time, he probably did 
not have much criticism of the Federal Reserve System. In 1928, he commended it, 
saying it had prevented panics since it had come into being.
14
      
 Eccles witnessed the crises of 1921, 1924 and 1927, but they did not shock his 
confidence in the fundamental correctness of the economic system. The crisis that started 
in 1929, however, made it clear to him that something was fundamentally and terribly 
wrong. “During 1930, I awoke to find myself at the bottom of a pit,” he writes. Despite 
seventeen years of experience with the world of finance, he felt he knew nothing of its 
economic and social effects. The depression was a personal affront to him. Why did 
falling prices and increasing unemployment make the dollar “sounder?” What could 
bankers do when declining values made it impossible for farmers to pay back loans, on 
farms, livestock and securities? Why could “men on the farms and men in the cities” not 
trade the goods needed by the other? Who should do something? The Government, as 
some people proposed? Why the Government?
15
  
 It took Eccles two years before he thought he had some answers and could 
conceptualize what was wrong, or what had caused the depression, or what were the 
solutions. He developed his vision of the way forward while saving his and other banks 
from failure with bluff, intelligence, and luck. That not one depositor in Eccles’s banks 
lost his money reinforced Eccles’s reputation and authority, and gave his ideas weight. 
To dismiss him as an unworldly radical was not easy to do. The fight to save his own 
banks made him question the conduct of other bankers during depression times, and 
speculate whether they themselves had not made matters worse.
16
   
 For the first time in March 1931, Eccles spoke publicly about his developing ideas 
in a speech, rather vaguely titled “Banking as related to Economic Conditions.” He 
delivered this speech at a conference of bankers in Salt Lake City. What he would say 
more coherently two years later to the Senate Finance Committee was already evident in 
this speech. Gone was the idea of more or less automatic progress through thrift, 
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economy, toil, and non-interference from the government. “The solution of the 
depression is not an easy one and will not correct itself,” he said, adding that bankers 
were powerless as individuals to solve the problems, as “banking is not a thing apart.” He 
put forward the view that world factors over which bankers individually have but limited 
control largely determined and greatly influenced from without deposits, loans, 
investments, interests and expenses. One of these world factors apparently was America’s 
central banking policy. That policy had clearly failed in recent year. “In 1928 and 
1929 … our central banking authorities … failed to measure up to their responsibility … 
to regulate the supply of money as to keep it in the need of business and not stock market 
gambling.” He blamed the Federal Reserve System for allowing the deflation, which 
followed the crash. He noted that the failure to regulate the supply of money in such a 
way that there was a stable price level threw “our world industrial machinery” out of 
balance and brought about under-consumption. Eccles saw this not only as an economic, 
but also as a moral issue. He quoted approvingly Owen D. Young (of the 1929 
reconstruction of Germany’s War Reparations) who argued that “the stability of the 
purchasing power of money goes to the very base of life”, and that, when it suddenly 
changed, “it touches every kind of moral question and every kind of obligation.”17 
 A year later, in June 1932, Eccles delivered another speech to the Utah Bankers. 
This time the title was less vague: “Depression, its Causes, Effects and Suggested 
Remedies.” Eccles’s central idea of under-consumption being the root of the problem was 
clearly discernible in this speech. “Our depression was not brought about as a result of 
extravagance (and) high taxation  ... We consume far less than we produce .” He went on 
to say that after World War I, an unbalance between capital and consumption emerged. 
Government paid off its debts and balanced its budget. One of the greatest mistakes, 
according to Eccles, was the elimination of corporate taxes and excess profit taxes and 
the reduction of inheritance taxes, all of which stimulated capital investments. Thus, 
“whenever our capital accumulation reaches a point where our production is beyond the 
ability to consume goods … because of lack of purchasing power, you have a depression. 
The Federal Reserve Bank was to blame because of making possible in 1927 and 1928 
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and possibly 1926 … the unnecessarily and undue expansion of credit in the years 1927 
and 1928.”18 
 Eccles had clearly lost confidence in his beliefs from six years before that 
“progress comes only through toil, economy and thrift.” Now, repudiating his father, he 
said, “The theory of hard work and thrift as a means of pulling us out is unsound 
economically. True hard work means more production; thrift and economy mean less 
consumption.” To reconcile these opposing forces, Eccles’s solution was to give buying 
power to the consumers. More buying power would mean more consumption, and more 
consumption would mean less unemployment. The only institution able to achieve this 
turn around was the Federal Government. “There is only one agency, that can turn the 
cycle upward and that is the Government.” Unlike cities, counties and states, he 
explained, the Federal Government did not have to balance its budget and it had the 
power to control money and credit.
19
  
 To Eccles, unemployment was not only an economic problem, but also even a 
moral problem. He wondered why it was not a problem to spend billions to finance 
World War I, or why it was not a problem in 1918 to have a budget deficit of eight billion 
dollars and in 1919 of thirteen billion dollars. If these were seemingly acceptable, why 
then was it a problem to supply credit or money to take care of the unemployed through 
public works or an unemployment wage “to give men who are able and worthy and 
willing to work the opportunity to work and to guarantee to them sustenance for their 
families and protection against want and destitution?” His answer was, therefore, that the 
government should spend $5 billion to create employment. Interestingly, here Eccles 
showed an awareness of the multiplier effect. Anticipating criticism, he answered the 
question of how to pay for the $5 billion when he observed that incomes, production and 
consumption would increase, thus giving society a greater ability to repay this amount.
20
 
 In both speeches, he also pointed to the problem of inter-allied debts. The United 
States had changed from a great debtor nation to a great creditor nation. It had collected a 
large stock of gold. During the First World War, it lent large amounts to European 
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countries. Paying back these loans in goods and services was difficult due to the high 
tariffs. To Eccles, the problem of international debts was the origin of the economic 
troubles.      
    Seven months later, in February 1933, when Eccles appeared before the Senate 
Finance Committee, his views were fully developed. He did not believe any longer in the 
orthodox and generally accepted idea that depressions were due to God-given economic 
laws, over which humans had no control. No, economics was manmade and humankind 
had developed it. To Eccles economics was “the production and distribution of wealth 
brought about by the application of labor to raw materials.” The idea of economics being 
God-given was nothing more than men with great economic power making the rules of 
the economic game, and shaping the actions of the government to enforce those rules. 
Only when it was in the interest of these men did government take action. That is, 
concluded Eccles, why President Hoover founded the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC). When the eastern banks ran into trouble because their loans to 
western banks defaulted, they needed the RFC to cover their losses.
21
  
 Eccles also had concluded that the depression was not due to profligacy. On the 
contrary, “we were excessively thrifty.” Until 1929, high levels of employment were 
financed through a great expansion of debt outside the banks, for instance in the form of 
mortgages on homes, consumer installment debt and loans for stock-market speculation. 
That expansion stopped in 1929 and brought on the depression with decreasing 
consumption, prices, earnings, wages and employment.  
 To Eccles the solution was not to restore confidence of the business community 
by balancing the federal budget. Balancing the economy had to restore confidence after 
which a balanced budget would follow. He believed that an unbalanced budget was an 
effect, not a cause of a lack of confidence. The only way out of the depression was to 
place purchasing power in the hands of people through government action. This activist 
role of government Eccles related to a larger credo he formulated at that time: the main 
concern for the economy is to assure maximum employment to all its members. The way 
to achieve this, if the society is to adhere to capitalism, was placing reliance on private 
enterprise. Government can and should insist on minimum standards of decency for its 
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people, being a minimum income, a minimum age for schooling and employment, a 
maximum age for retirement, decent and safe working conditions, benefits for labor due 
to rising productivity, protection and security for the aged and unemployed, and adequate 
educational, health and recreational facilities.
22
     
 In his opening remarks to the Senate Finance Committee, Eccles asked the 
Committee to recognize that the breakdown of the economic system was due to the 
failure of the political and financial leadership to deal intelligently with the money 
problem. The monetary system had not provided sufficient purchasing power to enable 
the people to obtain the goods the nation was producing. “The orthodox capitalistic 
system … will no longer serve our purpose … [and] our money world … is our tyrant 
and master.” He explained that the problem was under-consumption, not overproduction, 
that the deflation had increased the debt burden, measured in real terms, and that only the 
government could provide the remedy. He asked the senators, ”Why was it that during 
the (First World) War, when there was no depression we did not insist upon balancing the 
budget … to maintain the Government credit when we had a deficit of $9 billion in 1918 
and $13 billion in 1919? Why was it that there was no unemployment at that time and 
insufficient amount of money?” After enumerating that, after the First World War, the 
government had balanced its budget, and paid off $10 billion of its debt, that foreign 
countries had received credits in the amount of $10 billion and capital had accumulated 
another $100 billion, he asked, “Is it necessary to conserve Government credit to the 
point of a starvation existence for millions in a land of superabundance?”23        
 What the government had to do was raise the price level of raw products and 
increase employment in order to increase the demand for consumer goods. To achieve 
this, Eccles presented his “five-point program” of first-aid measures, which he called in 
Beckoning Frontiers a “silhouette (of) the undertakings of the New Deal.”24 Repeatedly 
interrupted by senators, he nevertheless went on to explain the five points. His first 
proposal was to provide to the states, as a gift, not a loan, $0.5 billion to take care of “the 
destitute and unemployed.” Calling it a “national disgrace” to permit suffering and 
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remarking that is was incomprehensible that the people continued “the stupidity” to suffer 
bread lines, suicides and despair, he warned, “We shall either adopt a plan which will 
meet this situation under capitalism or a plan will be adopted for us, which will operate 
without capitalism.” 25 
 The questions, the senators put to Eccles, centered on why the states, specifically 
rich states as New York, Ohio, Massachusetts and Illinois were not able to finance relief 
on their own. Eccles explained that the Federal Government should finance the outlined 
programs because its credit rating was much better than that of the states. The market for 
securities issued by a state is simply not as good as that for securities of the Federal 
Government, he explained. This was not easy going for Eccles. The senators did not 
understand or believe that the Federal Government should provide relief funds to the 
states.      
 His second proposal was to increase the amount available to the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation to $2.5 billion or more, as necessary, for self-liquidating projects 
and low interest loans to cities specifically for public works. According to Eccles, this 
concept became the basis of a New Deal project: the Public Works Administration.
26
 
After a discussion on how to finance this proposal, Eccles mentioned that he had a better 
alternative for this proposal. It was an adapted version of an idea he had recently read 
about in Harper’s Magazine. Eccles proposed to compensate deposits lost after 1929 and 
to adopt a deposit guarantee plan. This warranty had to cover every bank, because 
exclusion of a bank would mean the destruction of that bank. Eccles later claimed that the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Company, established a year later, incorporated this idea.
27
 To 
Senator Thomas Gore this plan had a fundamental error. It could not distinguish between 
honest and competent bankers and dishonest and incompetent bankers.
28
  
 Regulation of the production of wheat and corn was Eccles’s third emergency 
measure, an allotment plan. Its aim was to raise the price of these products to the level of 
world prices. Of course, this would also raise the cost to the consumer and more 
                                               
25
 Committee on Finance United States Senate 72
nd
 Congress, Second Session, “Hearings on Investigation 
of Economic Problems” (February 13-28, 1933), 713. 
26
 Eccles and Hyman, Beckoning Frontiers, 107. 
27
 Ibid., 108. 
28
 In principle, Senator Gore had a point. Today we would say that the senator pointed at a moral hazard: 
the bankers could take every risk with the deposits of their clients, because the guarantee fund would 
recover all potential losses.     
 15 
generally raise the general price level of other agricultural products like rice, vegetables 
and dairy. At the same time, the purchasing power of all farmers, not only producers of 
cotton and wheat would increase, and they would buy more goods and services, thus 
increasing employment. More importantly, general income would rise to a far greater 
degree than the total increase of costs to the consumer because of what Eccles called the 
“velocity of money,” and what economists today would call the multiplier-effect. To 
skeptical senators he said that in Denmark and Holland such a plan was in operation. 
Eccles’s allotment plan started the discussion that would eventually lead to the 
Agriculture Adjustment Act, or such was the claim made by Eccles.
29
    
 In his fourth proposal, he called for refinancing of farm mortgages to accompany 
the allotment plan. Existing farm mortgages were to be refunded on a long-term basis and 
at a low interest rate. To take over farm mortgages, the plan proposed that Federal land 
banks would raise $5 billion, by selling federally guaranteed bonds. Farmers, paying an 
annuity of 5%, with 3% interest and 0.7% for expenses, would pay back the loan over 40 
years. The benefits of this refunding would “make liquid billions of dollars of assets for 
which there is no market today (and) it will bring about a reduction of at least one third of 
the average annual payments on the farm debt.” Both plans, the allotment plan and 
mortgages-refinancing plan, promised to save the agriculture industry from collapse and 
at the same time expand its purchasing power. Conspicuously, there was no discussion of 
the mortgage plan between Eccles and/or the senators of the Committee. Eccles recalled 
that his plan “met a total indifferent reception” from the members of the Committee. 
Nevertheless, a month later, according to Eccles, the Roosevelt Administration acting 
along the line of these recommendations, set up the Farm Credit Administration to 
refinance the agricultural industry.
30
    
 Eccles’s last point was a permanent settlement of inter-allied debts. To Eccles that 
settlement was a necessary condition to start the economic recovery in the United States. 
Eccles explained to the senators that repayment of the those debts by the debtors, of 
which France and Great Britain were the most important, was only possible when they 
had a favorable balance of trade with the United States, or when they exported gold. High 
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tariffs (Eccles probably was here referring to the Smoot-Hartley Act of 1930) made 
export to the United States almost impossible. Repaying debts through exporting gold to 
the United States depreciated a debtor’s currency compared to the dollar, thus making it 
impossible to import from the United States. These two solutions – breaking down the 
tariff wall, and cancelling the debt – were, according to Eccles, mathematical and not 
moral solutions, from which American labor and agriculture would greatly benefit. It was 
clear what Eccles preferred: cancellation of the inter-allied debts.
31
   
 Concluding the explanation of his five-point plan, Eccles stressed that his plan 
was an emergency plan aimed at jumpstarting the recovery. To prevent future depressions, 
he advised, the government needed more control of the economic system, more effective 
control of the money supply and credit, and it needed to unify the banking system under 
the supervision of the Federal Reserve. As well, Eccles thought the government must 
levy high income and inheritance taxes in order to control capital accumulations, and it 
must adopt laws on child labor, minimum wage, unemployment and old age. Eccles 
thought the Federal government should approve capital issues and foreign financing, and 
control Transportation and Communication. He proposed that a national Planning Board 
should coordinate public and private activities. Eccles warned, ”You have got to take care 
of the unemployed or you are going to have revolution in this country … When you have 
enough unemployed they will control the Government and change our present political, 
social and economic system.”32 To his great personal satisfaction two years later, the 
business magazine Fortune, referring to Eccles’s five points, wrote that compared “with 
the economics of the present administration … M. S. Eccles of Ogden, Utah was not only 
a Mormon but a prophet.”33   
 Eccles always maintained that his concepts later called “Keynesian” had not come 
from John Maynard Keynes. He argued that he had never read Keynes’s books, except 
for short excerpts. “My conceptions were based on naked-eye observation in the 
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intermountain region.”34 That is hard to believe, unless one accepts that there is the more 
deep-seated and plausible explanation, which historian Jonathan Hughes provides. It is 
his Mormon heritage. In the last half of the 19
th
 century, Brigham Young created, when 
he was developing the West, a “unique mixture of theocratic and egalitarian democracy, 
with both individual and communitarian ownership and responsibility in economic 
affairs.” In that society, individuals should, in agreement with the Parable of the Talents 
improve “their earthly treasures” through hard work, but not without caring for the 
unfortunate. Because economic equality served the unity of the Church, there was a 
certain idea of a just distribution of income and wealth. A Mormon was not an owner of 
property but a steward. A progressive tax was a good way to equalize incomes. In this 
way connecting the spiritual with the temporal, the Church had the authority to direct the 
economy. The means to do that provided the 10% tithe each Mormon had to pay every 
year. In this way, Eccles learned that a central power could be effective and not a threat 
to private property.
35
  
 May also holds that Eccles Mormon heritage was the key deciding factor in his 
beliefs. Brigham Young and his successors built the Mormon Church and Utah by 
providing jobs to immigrants on public works like temples and canals, funded by the 
Church. In that way, two attitudes developed among Mormons. First, they believed that 
the Church had the right and duty to plan and direct the economy of the region. Second, 
Mormons thought the Church should provide jobs to the needy when times were 
difficult.
36
  
 Mark Nelson supports this view. By the time David Eccles arrived in Utah, the 
Mormon Church was encouraging and investing in private enterprises, one of which was 
the sugar beet company of David Eccles. The Church also promoted cooperatives. It 
distributed the accumulated contributions of its members to the needy. This had to have 
had an influence on Eccles’s view on the “interplay between business and government.” 
Moreover, Nelson argues, that Keynes indeed influenced Eccles. “Throughout 1931 and 
1932, Keynes was mentioned in the Salt Lake Times and the Ogden Standard-Examiner. 
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For anyone keeping abreast of economic thought in the early 1930s, as Eccles clearly was, 
exposure to the British economist was nearly unavoidable.”37 
 David Eccles and his offspring always lived in Utah where an economic 
environment existed in which the “government,” in this case the Mormon Church, 
intervened in the economy and provided jobs to the unemployed and nothing about this 
was seen as a socialist deviation or abomination. In this relatively small-scale, closed 
economy, a keen observer like Marriner Eccles could see how the macro-economic 
processes worked. He had experienced how government by building roads and dams 
helped private industry, including his own companies. All this was “fertile soil for his 
later development of a rationale, recommending government action to stimulate the 
sluggish national economy of the 1930s.”38  
 It is rather peculiar that neither Eccles himself, nor his biographer Hyman, writes 
anything about the obvious influence of the Mormon society to explain the beliefs Eccles 
developed after 1931. In that year, he awoke as Joseph in his pit wondering why he was 
at fault and feeling the depression as a personal affront. Why he had these feelings and 
questions, he apparently did not ask or, more likely, did not want to ask himself. Clearly, 
the fact that unemployment for Eccles was foremost a moral problem was due to his 
Mormon roots.   
 To understand what was going on after the crash of 1929 and, more importantly, 
to come to grips with what to do about it, Eccles did not look to professional economists. 
According to Hyman, Eccles, in 1931, trying to climb out of his pit, discovered the post-
1929 writings of William F. Foster. This non-professional economist argued two issues, 
which appealed very much to Eccles: The cause of the Depression was not riotous 
spending but riotous saving; the solution was to increase buying power. Eccles’s “fertile 
soil” readily soaked up these words.  
 In 1928, Foster had co-authored The Road to Plenty with Waddill Catchings, a 
former iron manufacturer. Foster and Catchings were among the first to start the debate 
on Say’s Law or the Law of Markets, until the Depression an undisputed keystone of 
classical economic thought. This law is often misunderstood, for instance by Keynes 
                                               
37 Mark W. Nelson, Jumping the Abyss: Marriner S. Eccles and the New Deal 1933-1940. Ph.D. 
Dissertation. (Claremont Graduate University, 2012), 54, 72-73. 
38
 May, From New Deal to New Economics, 42-43. 
 19 
himself, as saying that supply creates its own demand, meaning in the end, that the supply 
and demand of goods and services are always equal at the point where all resources are 
fully employed. An excess of supply over demand, a general glut by definition is not 
possible.
39
 Income generated by sales is always sufficient to buy the goods available. 
Thus, a capitalist economy naturally tends to full employment and prosperity, provided 
the government does not interfere. This law was the basis of the doctrine of the orthodox 
laissez faire, non-regulated, free enterprise economy, in which depressions and recessions 
are merely natural corrections on the way to a new equilibrium. 
 Foster and Catchings argued in The Road to Plenty that Say’s Law did not apply 
to a money economy, because of what they called the Dilemma of Thrift, which led to 
their central theme of under-consumption. They wondered why it was  impossible for the 
people, as consumers, to acquire the commodities they are able and willing to make. The 
answer was that individuals and corporations had to save a portion of the money they 
received, thus restricting their buying power. The result is an unbalance between supply 
and demand. Moreover, savings, when invested in new capacities, create an extra supply 
of goods, making the problem worse. Unless incomes increase to buy the available goods, 
production will decrease and unemployment will rise. Supply and demand may reach a 
new equilibrium, but at a lower level where not all resources are fully employed. To have 
full employment of all resources, an adequate level of income is necessary. The only 
institution able to “put money into consumers’ hands” is the government.  
 Foster and Catchings acknowledged that to do that the Government would have to 
borrow money and increase the National Debt. They did not see that debt as a big 
problem, because it was a debt the American people owed to itself.
40
 Only eight years 
later, in the words of Paul Krugman, Keynes made his critical innovation by 
“demolishing” Say’s law in his General Theory. Like Foster and Catchings, Keynes 
argued that Say’s Law worked in a barter economy, but would not work in an economy in 
which money and prices as such played a role.  
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 The possibility that under-consumption as outlined by Foster and Catchings, or 
demand-failure as summarized by Keynes, caused the Depression, was – to use a Dutch 
expression – “cursing in the church.” As John Kenneth Galbraith wrote, “Say was the test 
by which reputable economists were distinguished from the crackpots … (N)o candidate 
for a Ph.D. at a major American University who spoke seriously about a shortage of 
purchasing power as a cause of recession could be passed.”41 Franklin D. Roosevelt read 
The Road to Plenty and thought it too good to be true.
42
  
 Very likely, it was Foster and Catchings but also maybe Keynes who influenced 
Eccles in his view that under-consumption was the main cause of the Depression. 
Eventually, according to Hyman, Marriner S. Eccles’s interpretation of under-
consumption and his analysis of the Great Depression surpassed that of Foster and 
Catchings “in concreteness, trenchancy and fundamental challenge to the reasoning of 
major leaders of business opinion.”43 
 
Chapter 2.  “A weak reed to lean on.” Eccles and the historians on the failure of the 
Federal Reserve System 
 “I would not touch the position with a ten-foot pole unless fundamental changes were 
made in the Federal Reserve System … but, Mr. President, if you will help bring about 
by law the necessary legal changes … I would welcome any consideration … to serve as 
governor.” That was, according to Hyman, the blunt answer of Eccles when, in 
September 1934, President Roosevelt asked him if he was to become governor of the 
Federal Reserve Board.
44
 Eccles himself described his reaction in a more restrained 
manner: “I replied that the post would be an appealing one only if fundamental changes 
were made.”45 
 Hyman has concluded that after 1931, when Eccles saw the collapse of many 
banks, he came to believe that the way to influence the national economy was through a 
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reformed Federal Reserve System.
46
 This conclusion cannot be drawn directly from 
Eccles’s speeches. Of course, he did blame the Federal Reserve System for its role in the 
Depression. Nevertheless, he placed responsibility for the crash primarily on the Federal 
Government. In 1931, he observed that in 1928 and 1929 “our central banking authorities, 
influenced by some of our leading commercial bankers failed in their responsibility to 
regulate the supply of money.
47
 Eccles’s view was that in order to improve price levels 
the Federal Reserve would have to have increased the volume of money and credit more 
than had been done. The Federal Reserve System had failed to do its job.
48
  
 In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, he acknowledged that the 
Federal Reserve Bank had a role to play in any new policies, but only as implementer. 
His notion was that to play its proper role, the System needed a complete overhaul, but he 
did not say as much in his testimony, or in his speeches before 1934. On the banking 
system, he only said, without explaining further, that there should be “unification under 
supervision of the Federal Reserve Bank.” Even in his last public speech, in October 
1933, shortly before his appointment as Assistant to the Secretary of Treasury, there was 
no word on the Federal Reserve System. Instead, he stressed again that the Federal 
Government should increase its expenditures to get out the Depression. From the 
statistics published by the Federal Reserve System, he concluded that the problem was 
not lack of cash reserves to expand credit. He thought the Federal Government should 
supply the match to light this pile of financial fuel.
49
 
 What then is the explanation for Eccles’s “ten-foot pole” answer to the President? 
In Beckoning Frontiers, Eccles writes that he explained to the President that the System 
had lost the balance between private and public interests that had been part of its design, 
as well as losing the equilibrium between de-central and central authorities. In his view, 
the Reserve Banks representing the private interests now dominated the System, and the 
Reserve Board, which was supposed to represent and safeguard the public interest, was 
powerless. Therefore, he concluded, fundamental change was necessary.
50
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 What was wrong with the System? How had the Federal Reserve Board failed as 
guardian of the public interest and why had it become an instrument of the various 
Reserve Banks as representatives of private interests? To Eccles this development was 
the result of events after the First World War through which ”a more effective way of 
diffusing responsibility and encouraging inertia and indecision could not very well have 
been devised.”51  
 When the war ended, the United States had a national debt of $27 billion. The 
Reserve Banks discovered that through buying and selling securities connected with that 
debt, they could influence the volume of reserves of member banks and from there the 
volume of deposits and funds available to commercial banks for loans. They also realized 
that the process of buying and selling of those securities needed coordination on a 
national scale. For that purpose, in 1923, they formed a committee made up of their chief 
executive officers, called “governors”, representing their banks. Since the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913 did not regulate this governor position, the Federal Reserve Board 
had no jurisdiction over these officers. It only had authority over the less influential 
position of Chairman of the Board of Directors of each Reserve Bank.  
 The personnel making up that committee of governors, as well as its name, 
alternated during the years, but in 1930, all twelve Reserve Bank governors were member 
of the committee, now named Open Market Policy Conference (OMPC). After approval 
by the OMPC and the Federal Reserve Board, an executive committee of five governors 
executed policy decisions. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York carried out the buying 
and selling transactions. The creation of this committee was a crucial decision, because 
through open market operations the Federal Reserve could control the supply of money. 
It was only in 1933 that enactment of the Banking Act of 1933 put this informal structure  
on a legal foundation. This act left intact the right of each Reserve Bank not to participate 
in the operations the committee had decided on. That provision, Eccles sarcastically 
remarked, was not a problem for the New York Reserve Bank “through which private 
interests in the New York financial district exercised such enormous influence over the 
national economy.”52  
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 To Eccles the obvious “villain” was the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
which was the representative of the eastern financial interests. These interests stood in the 
way of implementing inflationary policies Eccles thought were required. As he had said 
to the Senate Financial Committee, the problem was not that there was not enough money 
to restore prices. The problem was a “maladjustment” of money. Money was 
concentrated in the eastern financial centers, the creditor sectors. During the depression, 
the flow of funds from these eastern, creditor sections to the western, debtor sections had 
stopped.  That caused the velocity of money, by Eccles defined as the turnover of bank 
deposits,
53
 to drop from 45 in 1929 to 16 at the beginning of 1933. This decline of 64% 
was relatively larger than the 22% decline in the same period for deposits and currency. 
Correcting the “maladjustment” through government action, which Eccles considered the 
only possible way to make a correction, would increase the velocity of money. That 
would in turn result in higher prices. If he meant for this government action also to 
include reform of the Federal Reserve System, Eccles did not say.
54
  
 This analysis showed, according to May, that Eccles “clearly harbored a populist 
anti-eastern bias, no doubt a legacy of the frequent need to go into the New York capital 
markets in order to develop a remote western area chronically running an unfavorable 
balance of payments in its dealings with the rest of the nation.”55 It seems that May uses 
the word “populist” more to characterize Eccles’s attitude to the East than to suggest the 
influence of the Populist movement, which was at its high point when Eccles was a 
young boy. 
 That Eccles came to Washington with a “native distrust of all things eastern,” 
May suggests, was due to Eccles’s father David, who was fond of pointing at Eastern-
educated fools as examples to avoid. Eccles’s anti-Eastern attitude shows up in 
Beckoning Frontiers where he describes the East in biblical terms as “Egypt” where he 
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travelled as “Joseph” to deal with the “Pharaoh” Roosevelt. Until the fortieth year of his 
life, Eccles believed what his father believed.
56
 He “was content to be the son of his 
father’s thoughts. He cared only for the wealth of his family (and) things that could be 
measured in dollars and cents.”57 Eccles “tended to follow the McKinley Republican 
leanings of his father.”58 As his son Marriner writes, David “had no ear for the new 
voices at the turn of the century that spoke of the danger of concentration of productive 
forces in fewer hands.” The warnings of Theodore Roosevelt and Louis Brandeis left him 
cold.
59
 Presumably, the same goes for the Populist movement with its clamor for 
currency reform, cooperation, budget reform and government intervention. Neither 
Eccles in Beckoning Frontiers, nor by extension Hyman in Private Entrepreneur and 
Public Servant, devotes one word to the Populist movement. In 1931, Eccles saw that his 
father’s world was gone and his views were invalidated. Witnessing the dismal effects of 
the Depression, he repudiated his father’s beliefs and turned to the solution of 
government intervention that he had witnessed on a small scale in the Mormon society. 
 Government action was necessary, stressed Eccles to the Senate Finance 
Committee. However, if this also included reform of the Federal Reserve System, he did 
not say. Probably, it was during his short tenure in 1934, at the Treasury Department, that 
he fully developed the vision that correcting the “maladjustment” meant a complete 
overhaul of the Federal Reserve System. At the Treasury, he met Lauchlin Currie, who 
almost certainly nudged Eccles in that direction. Currie, a professional economist from 
Harvard, also was a “pre-Keynesian.” He was one of the seven Harvard economists who 
in January 1934 wrote a letter to President Roosevelt to support the President’s monetary 
and government expenditures policies, which were being criticized by professional 
economists.
60
 Shortly after he signed this letter to the President, Currie moved to 
Washington to work at the Treasury Department.    
 In April 1934, Currie published an article in which he sharply criticized the 
Federal Reserve System for its failure to prevent the Depression. “Grave mistakes were 
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made by the Reserve administration, either by acts of commission or omission,” he 
wrote.
61
 The biggest blunder in his opinion was the intensification of the Federal 
Reserve’s campaign against speculation on the stock market, which forced interest rates 
to rise after which business activity declined.”62 This policy … operated to bring (the 
depression) on.” Currie concluded that the concern of the Federal Reserve “should be 
with the industrial picture in its broadest aspects, (i.e.) with monetary incomes and … 
expenditure in relation to the output of consumers’ and producers’ goods . … A 
necessary prerequisite to a sounder banking policy in the future is a modification of the 
administrations conception of the function of a central bank. ... Unless the reserve 
administration is prepared to modify (this) conception … it will not be able to avail itself 
of the great advances in monetary theory.”63 One of these advances was viewing the real 
bills doctrine as a cause of the Depression. Very likely Currie discussed his beliefs with 
Eccles: in this way Eccles reached the conclusion that the Federal Reserve System 
needed an overhaul. Thus, it is not a surprise that Currie helped Eccles to prepare, and 
may have even written, the memorandum, which Eccles used to propose reforms of the 
Federal Reserve to President Roosevelt.
64
      
 Thus, Eccles’s position on the causes and remedies of the Depression in sum, 
were that the cause of the Depression was under-consumption, for which the remedy was 
to put money into the consumers’ hands. He insisted that there was enough money to do 
just that. Due to bad regulation, however, – a “maladjustment” –, eastern financial banks 
had that money tied up. Only action by the Federal government and, by extension, a 
reconstruction of the Federal Reserve System could free this money from the hands of the 
private interests in New York. How this view corresponds with or differ from views of 
other historians or economists such as Milton Friedman, Allan Meltzer, Herbert Stein and 
John Kenneth Galbraith, is the question we turn to next.  
 Milton Friedman, in cooperation with Anna Schwartz, wrote more than 120 pages 
to explain “The Great Contraction of 1929-1933” in their Monetary History of the United 
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States, 1867-1960.
65
 In their view, due to an inept monetary policy, “the monetary system 
collapsed, but it clearly need not have done so.”66 The Federal Reserve System should 
have continued the policies it itself had outlined in the 1920s, the period they call “the 
high tide of the Reserve System.” Then, “the most severe business-cycle contraction … 
in the whole of the U.S. history” would not have happened. They contend that if the 
monetary authorities had prevented the decline in the stock of money, money-incomes 
would not have declined by one-half and wholesale prices by one-third from 1929 to 
1933.
67
 
 Why did the System not continue its “active, vigorous, self-confident” policy of 
the 1920s and why after 1929 was it “passive, defensive, hesitant?” wonder Friedman and 
Schwartz?
68
 Their view is that at all times alternative policies were technically possible. 
Adequate measures would and could have prevented the three banking crises of 1930, 
1931 and 1933.
69
 Their answer is clear: there was a lack of leadership as well as a lack of 
knowledge of monetary matters. From 1914 until his death in 1928, Benjamin Strong, the 
Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was the undisputed leader of the 
System. New York was not only the most important financial market in the country, but 
also the US’ only international market. Foreign countries saw Strong as the central 
banker of the United States and he acted the part. He was the counterpart and compeer of 
the presidents of the great central banks of Great Britain, France and Germany, Montagu 
Norman, Emile Moreau and Hjalmar Schacht. Therefore, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York was the only Reserve Bank with a national and international outlook, through 
which it reached a “profound awareness of monetary relations and a sensitive recognition 
of the effects of monetary actions...Those qualities were clearly absent at most other 
Reserve Banks…or at the Federal Reserve Board.”70    
 After Strong’s death, the other Reserve Banks and the Board refused any longer to 
accept the leading role of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In 1930, this resulted 
in a power shift within the Federal Reserve System. Decisions on open market transaction 
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moved from the Open Market Investment Committee (OMIC), a committee of five 
Reserve Banks governors chaired and dominated by the governor of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, to the Open Market Policy Conference (OMPC), of which all twelve 
governors of the Reserve Banks were members. The OMIC continued as a downgraded 
committee that administered and executed the decisions of OMPC. However, although all 
governors participated in the discussions in the OMPC, they were not committed to 
executing the open market transactions that the OPMC recommended.
71
        
 According to Friedman and Schwarz, to take decisive actions in such a committee 
structure, demanded a strong, domineering personality, such as Strong possessed. 
Strong’s successor, George Harrison, was a man with a different personality. The 
Reserve Board could not provide the necessary leadership because it had only played the 
role of supervisor and reviewer in the years before 1929. The other Reserve Bank 
governors lacked the necessary monetary knowledge. Moreover, they were busy with 
their regional interests. This lack of decisive leadership happened in a particular 
intellectual climate, in which the dominant view was that the depression was a desirable 
and necessary correction in the economy.  
 For Friedman and Schwartz the most surprising discovery was the overwhelming 
influence of persons who were present at the creation of the Federal Reserve System, 
such as H. Parker Willis.
72
 The founders’ general view was that the System had resolved 
the problem of liquidity.
73
 The idea was that a rescue operation like that of the 
Knickerbocker Trust Company in 1907 was no longer necessary. That is why, as 
Friedman and Schwartz argue, the “Knickerbocker of 1930,” – the Bank of United States 
– went bust. That is why the Federal Reserve reacted so passively to the banking crises of 
1930, 1931 and ultimately of 1933, when the system collapsed and an unprecedented 
banking holiday of six and more days followed during which all banks restricted their 
activities in a way never seen before. The prevailing view was that a bank failure was a 
bank management problem, and not a concern for the System. However, the Federal 
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Reserve Bank of New York, knowing what bank failures meant, which other Reserve 
Banks and the Board did not, still was not able to persuade the other Banks or the Federal 
Reserve Board of its views.
74
         
 Like Friedman and Schwartz, Meltzer devotes more than 100 pages to finding an 
answer to “Why did Monetary Policy fail in the thirties?”75 He agrees with the consensus 
view, that the depth and duration of the Depression was the result of monetary actions or 
inactions. He sometimes critically reviews interpretations by other historians and 
economists, among them Milton Friedman, Elmus Wicker and Barry Eichengreen. 
Meltzer argues that ”the main reason for the failure of monetary policy in the depression 
was the reliance on an inappropriate set of beliefs about speculative excesses and real 
bills … embodied in the Riefler-Burgess framework, (which) directed attention to short 
term market interest rates and member bank borrowing.”76 Because the Federal Reserve 
System believed in 1928-1929 that using credit for speculation on the stock market was 
wrong, a flawed decision was taken not to interfere when money and credit contracted 
and deflation resulted.
77
  
 As Meltzer explains, in the 1920s two policy conceptions guided the actions of 
the Federal Reserve System. The first – the real bills doctrine – was one of the 
cornerstones of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. The second was the post-World War 1 
doctrine, Meltzer called the Riefler-Burgess doctrine after their originators, Winfield 
Riefler, an economist at the Reserve Board, and W. Randolph Burgess at the New York 
Reserve. It replaced the gold standard as the guiding principle of the economy. Though it 
was a cornerstone of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the System abandoned it because 
so few countries adhered to the gold standard any longer. Both doctrines aimed at 
preventing inflation by adapting money and credit to changes in output. The real bills 
doctrine learned that banks should only create credit and money against short-term 
commercial paper –  real bills – meaning bills arising from transactions having to do with 
real goods and services. If banks provided funds only to finance transactions of real 
goods and services and not for speculative stock transactions or mortgages, the supply of 
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money would automatically vary with the production and trade of goods and services. 
According to the Riefler-Burgess doctrine, however, short-term variations between 
money stock and output were possible. The instrument to deal with that was the open 
market policy, developed in 1922.  
 For modern day economists it is remarkable that the System did not distinguish 
between nominal and real interest rates.
78
 Meltzer calls this one of its biggest errors. It 
was because the real bill doctrine denied the role of money-as-such and therefore denied 
by definition that inflation or deflation could exist. No wonder, Irving Fischer, who had 
explained the crucial relation between the two rates, was “a bright but annoying crank” as 
far as real bill adherents were concerned.
79
 When the Federal Reserve System lowered 
the discount rate after 1929, starting in New York from 6% in the autumn of 1929 to 
1.5% two years later, the other Reserve Banks followed in limited fashion. The Federal 
Reserve System really thought it could stimulate the economy through making money 
easy, but did not recognize, however, the effects of deflation, which acted to hold real 
interest rates high. Only in combination with an increase in the money supply, would a 
lower discount rate have helped. Real interest rates were historically high after 1930. 
They rose from 5% in December 1929 to 10% in December 1931 and even 15% in 
December 1932.
80
  
 Meltzer concludes that adherence to the real bills and the Riefler-Burgess 
doctrines, and disregarding the difference between nominal and real interest, led the 
Federal Reserve Board and the Governors of the Reserve Banks to a situation “that the 
falling money stock more than offset the expansive effect of falling prices on real 
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balances. If the Federal Reserve had prevented the decline in money, falling prices would 
have … stimulated spending, and limited or ended the decline.”81 
Writing in the early 1950s on the stock market crash of October 1929, John 
Kenneth Galbraith devotes the last chapter of his book The Great Crash 1929 to the 
Great Depression that followed the crash. On the cause of the crash itself, Galbraith is 
adamant. It was speculation, made possible through margin trading or buying stock 
mainly with borrowed money. The Federal Reserve System was not willing to curb this 
speculation. “The Federal Reserve was helpless because it wanted to be.” It did not “ask 
Congress for authority … to set margin requirements.”82 It showed an “unexampled 
timidity and accepted incompetence,” as he writes in a later book A Short History of 
Financial Euphoria.
83
  
According to Galbraith, there were “five plausible causes” of why a seemingly 
normal downturn that started as a familiar inventory recession a few months before the 
Wall Street crash turned into a deep Depression, one that lasted for years.
84
 The first was 
the distribution of income. A mere 5% of the population received one third of all personal 
income, making spending and investment (too) dependent on a (too) small, affluent part 
of the population. Then, there was the bad corporate structure, meaning the holding 
companies and trust companies, which presented the danger of “reversed leverage.” 
Holding companies paid off their loans with the profits from their holding companies. 
When there were no profits, holding companies simply defaulted on their loans and 
collapsed. The third cause was the weak banking structure with its thousands of small 
independent banks. As a fourth cause, Galbraith mentions the trade balance. After the 
First World War, the United States changed from a debtor into a creditor nation. Not 
accepting the consequences of that position, the United States refused to enable countries, 
which had received loans from them to pay back the debt with the exports of goods and 
services to the United States. On the contrary, President Hoover increased the tariffs.
85
  
The last cause of the Depression, according to Galbraith was the “poor state of 
economic intelligence.” By this, he meant that those who advised policy makers were 
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“uniquely perverse,” because everything they said made things worse. In those times, 
responsible economic advisers always promoted recovery through a balanced budget that 
they said would provide confidence to the business community. While the “most violent 
deflation” was going on, these same advisers, remembering the inflation of the First 
World War, feared a repeat because the United States had accumulated a great stock of 
gold in the 1920s. A balanced budget and fear of inflation made it impossible to carry out 
measures like lowering the interest rate or easing borrowing. Devaluation of the dollar 
was also taboo. Until 1933, both political parties shared these views. To Galbraith this 
harmony of the parties was a marked achievement of the economic advisers. They “had 
both the unanimity and authority to force the leaders of both parties to disavow all the 
available steps to check deflation and depression … to let triumph dogma over 
thought.”86 Specifically, at the Federal Reserve Banks, the fear of inflation was high. 
Rather slowly, the System, headed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, lowered 
the discount rate. Until 1932, it avoided the more obvious course, Galbraith argues: flood 
the banks with funds by buying government securities.
87
 
In The Great Crash 1929, Galbraith is not clear if he views the crash itself as an 
important cause. “(A)mong the problems in assessing the causes of depression (no 
problem) is more intractable than the responsibility (of) the stock market crash.”88 Forty 
years later, however, in Financial Euphoria, he provides more clarity. “The Crash of 
1929 ushered in the dismal years of the Great Depression, for which, the stock-market 
debacle should rightly be held sharply responsible.” Galbraith holds that because of the 
crash, demand for goods weakened and business lost confidence. The crash “broke into a 
fragile economic structure.” Looking for “deeper factors, including an insufficiently 
relaxed Federal Reserve Policy … is evasion bordering on nonsense.”89 Apparently, by 
acting incompetently to prevent the Crash on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve System 
was more to blame for its policies before October 1929 than it was to blame for its 
policies during the Depression years. In 1990, the same year that Galbraith published his 
new insights, Christina Romer gave support to Galbraith’s updated vision. Based on 
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statistical evidence, she argued that there was a strong link between the 1929 Crash and 
the Depression. Her view is that customers delayed spending on goods, because they 
were uncertain of their future incomes.
90
      
According to Herbert Stein, when Franklin D. Roosevelt became president, a true 
fiscal revolution happened. In his book The Fiscal Revolution in America Stein starts his 
discussion on this revolution with a chapter he aptly calls “Pre-revolutionary Fiscal 
Policy: The regime of Herbert Hoover.” He explains in a positive way, how President 
Hoover confronted the Depression “with a package of attitudes and ideas, which even 
today sound modern.”91 
Stein admits that ultimately Hoover failed. That was not, however, because he 
“kowtowed to laissez faire and budget balancing.” Stein writes that Hoover believed the 
era of laissez faire was long gone, that depressions were not Acts of God, and that the 
economy needed the “deliberate social application of knowledge.” Hoover did not agree 
that depressions were natural and inevitable to purge the system, a view he called the 
“leave it alone liquidationist” view of Andrew Mellon, his Secretary of the Treasury.92 
Hoover saw unemployment as “his personal cross” and thought his measures would 
provide employment. He did not object to spending money for public works to reduce 
unemployment. One of his first acts in 1929 was to demand employers not cut wage rates. 
He saw himself belonging to the school of “Do Something.”93 
Nevertheless, Hoover did not mean that the government should have “a role as 
manager of the economy.” Instead, he tried to manage the economy by “talking to all 
vital forces.” Hoover tried to have all elements of society, federal, state and local 
governments, businesses and individuals cooperate to achieve the objectives of society. 
The role of the President was to point the way. Hoover indefatigably worked toward this 
aim by convening conferences, delivering advice to all sections of society, and creating 
organizations for cooperation. In March 1929, voluntary cooperation was one of 
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Hoover’s themes in his Inaugural Address. The next month, he proposed the creation of a 
farmers’ organization, the Federal Farm Board, but offered no governmental support.94 
Stein argues that Hoover also accepted the principle that a budget should be in 
balance. Hoover knew, however, that such a concept was elastic. Hoover did not think a 
budget had to be in balance every year. Expenses on debt reductions could be included or 
excluded. No matter how elastic the concept was, Hoover also clearly held the belief that 
a balanced budget was necessary for recovery. A balanced budget would assure the 
availability of credit to business borrowers, and stimulate spending on investments.
95
 
This thought expanded in 1931 into the Reconstruction Finance Company.  
In the autumn of 1931, President Hoover did exactly the opposite of what 
President Kennedy would do in the same situation some 30 years later. Hoover raised 
taxes. Kennedy lowered them. To Stein, the decision of President Kennedy characterizes 
the fiscal revolution he is writing about, which is to say, decrease taxes when 
unemployment is high and budget deficits threaten. Stein forgives Hoover his “desperate 
folly” since Hoover was acting in a situation in which interest rates were rising, bond 
prices falling, bank failures increasing and gold flowing out because Great Britain had 
left the gold standard in September 1931. Hoover was “on the side of monetary 
expansion.” To increase the money supply, he needed the cooperation of the Federal 
Reserve System. The System refused. Hoover felt powerless against the Federal Reserve 
System, which had “real independence of the government.” The government “could not 
compel cooperation.”96  
Caught between the rock of a non-cooperating Federal Reserve System and the 
hard place of his belief in a balanced budget, Hoover thought he had to raise taxes to do 
what the System should have done. Thus it is no wonder that Stein strongly concurs with 
Friedman and Schwartz that monetary contraction was not inevitable, and therefore, the 
Federal Reserve System is to blame for Hoover’s failure to recover from or relieve the 
downward economic spiral.                  
 Eccles clearly got the support of renowned economists and historians for his 
criticisms of the Federal Reserve System. Even though they differ on nearly every 
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economic issue, the monetarist Friedman and the Keynesian Galbraith agree on blaming 
the Federal Reserve System. They largely differ on why the System failed. Like Eccles, 
Galbraith sees under-consumption as the root cause of the problems. Like Eccles, 
Friedman and Schwartz point to a flaw in the structure of the System. For Eccles the 
System ignored the public interest and primarily served private interests. The center of 
those private interests was New York and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
dominated the System. For Friedman and Schwartz “New York” was a big problem, but 
seen from the other direction. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York had lost its 
dominant position and because of that, the System made the wrong decisions and did not 
continue the successful policies of 1920s, thus failing to prevent a contraction of the 
money supply.  
 To Meltzer, adherence to the wrong principles played a key role in the failure of 
the System after 1929. Of course, Meltzer also pointed to the dominance and leading 
position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He also described disagreements 
between the Reserve Banks and the Board in Washington. Apparently, however, Meltzer 
did not think the “balance of power” between the Reserve Banks, specifically the 
dominance of the New York Bank, was a relevant factor in the failure of the System. To 
him the real villains were wrong principles. Friedman and Schwartz, as true monetarists, 
wholeheartedly agree that the principles were wrong. In their view the real bills doctrine 
meant that the supply of money automatically adapted to the volume of trade and 
therefore was not under control of monetary authorities. For this reason, the System did 
not pay any attention to the stock of money in the 1920s. 
97
       
 Concurring with Friedman and Schwartz on the failure of the System, Stein, just 
like Eccles and Galbraith, stresses that economic orthodoxy of a balanced budget limited 
President Hoover’s efforts to solve the crisis. Because the System refused monetary 
expansion, Hoover was the victim of Federal Reserve inaction, and had no option other 
than to raise taxes. 
98
 
 Minor differences of opinion aside, the consensus was that the Federal Reserve 
System failed after the Crash on Wall Street. Eccles, Galbraith, Friedman, Schwartz, 
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Stein and Meltzer would certainly agree with the bitter conclusion President Herbert 
Hoover drew in his account of his policies during the Depression Years 1929-1933: the 
Federal Reserve Board was “a weak reed for a nation to lean on in time of trouble.”99 
Fortifying and strengthening that reed began in 1934 once Eccles became Governor of 
the Federal Reserve System. 
 
Chapter 3. Reconstruction and “in the back seat.” The Federal Reserve System in 
the 1930s 
 “The modern Fed began in 1935,” asserts Greider.100 On August 23, President Roosevelt 
signed into law the Banking Act of 1935. Because of this act, “the foundations of the 
American financial structure and the character of the monetary standard were profoundly 
changed,” conclude Friedman and Schwartz.101 Meltzer writes, “The Banking Act of 
1935 permitted the Federal Reserve to become a central bank.”102 Helen Burns argues 
that the Banking Act was “an administration victory in the direction of monetary 
management, credit control, and federal supervision of banking.”103 Specifically it was a 
triumph for Marriner Eccles who authored the most important section of the bill. The 
Roosevelt Administration submitted the Banking Act to the House and the Senate in 
February 1935. Eccles did not gain everything he wanted, but to him ”it was a workable 
bill that set up a far more effective central banking system (and) firmly established the 
authority of the Federal Reserve Board.”104  
 The law came after a hard fight between Eccles, supported by the House of 
Representatives, and Senator Carter Glass, supported by a group of illustrious bankers 
and financial-economic scholars. President Roosevelt signed the final version of the Act 
in August 1935, which was a compromise between what Eccles called an “aggressive” 
bill, approved by an overwhelming majority of the House in May, and the “woefully 
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inadequate” Senate version.105 In the Conference Committee, called to reconcile the 
differences, both sides made concessions. Eccles argues, supported by press reports after 
the signing ceremony, that although Glass gained more concessions, the House preserved 
the provisions that Eccles thought were basic and essential.
106
       
 The process leading to this Act began on November 4, 1934. On that day, Eccles 
presented his conditions for accepting the nomination for Governor of the Federal 
Reserve Board in a memorandum, “Desirable Changes in the Administration of the 
Federal Reserve System.” His “modest proposal” as he referred to it in Beckoning 
Frontiers, showed Eccles as the proponent of the idea that economic recovery would 
have to have its foundation in government action. The Federal Reserve System would and 
should play its own specific role, but a supporting one, “assuring that adequate support is 
available…for the emergency financing involved in the recovery program.” Eccles 
thought that the Fed’s monetary mechanism ought to be “an instrument for the promotion 
of business stability.” That demanded control of the money supply. Changes in the supply 
of money, according to Eccles, caused fluctuations in production, employment and 
national income. Without controls, he said, these changes reinforced a depression. With 
controls, the monetary mechanism was able to expand or decrease the supply of money, 
according to what was necessary for business stability. He added that “the duties of the 
reserve administration were preventing that a recovery result in inflation and recovery 
was followed by a depression.” In essence, Eccles here argued that the Federal Reserve 
System should act in, what is nowadays called, a countercyclical way: stimulate the 
economy when there is a recession and slow down the economy when it is overheated.
107
 
 Eccles’s first requested change – flowing from these premises – was complete 
control of open market transactions by the Federal Reserve Board. To Eccles, buying and 
selling of government securities was the most important instrument of control of the 
Federal Reserve System. The Board already had a say in the other two instruments, the 
discount rate and reserve requirements, but it still could not initiate open market 
operations. These operations now were in the hands of the Reserve Banks, more 
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specifically, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which could not help but be 
“profoundly influenced by their narrow banking rather than broad social view.”108  
 The second preferred change was to make the appointments of the Governors of 
the 12 Reserve Banks subject to approval by the Board. The position of Governor, the 
chief executive officer of a Reserve Bank, did not exist when the Federal Reserve System 
started in 1914. Therefore, contrary to the Chair, appointments to this most important 
position did not need approval of the Board. These and other changes Eccles proposed, 
“introduce certain attributes of central banking,” but preserved private ownership and 
local autonomy of the System. However, the “really important questions (would be) 
concentrated in the Board.”109 
 Remarkably, in Beckoning Frontiers Eccles writes that, from his experience 
keeping his banks open, in addition to the two changes mentioned above, he also pressed 
Roosevelt for change of the basis for rediscount from “eligible paper” to “sound assets.” 
Eccles writes that this was the most important technical issue he discussed with the 
President. Of course, it is possible that he discussed an attack on the real bills doctrine 
with the President. However, the words “sound assets” or “rediscount” are not in his 
memorandum “Desirable Changes.” This omission is even stranger knowing that Currie, 
who supported Eccles writing the memorandum, or may even have written it himself, 
probably was the one who taught Eccles that the real bills doctrine was a cause of the 
depression and that it was the Fed’s responsibility to control the quantity of money, not 
the quality of credit. One could argue, however, that Eccles’s third desirable change was 
implicit in his first premise that the monetary system should control the supply of 
money.
110
     
 These proposals were the basis of the most important and controversial part of the 
bill the Roosevelt Administration submitted to Congress on February 5, 1935. Title II, 
written by Eccles and Currie without any consultation with the Reserve Banks or even the 
other Board members, vested the authority for open market transactions in the Federal 
Reserve Board. Killing the real bills doctrine, it made any “sound asset” eligible for 
discount. The bill specified that the Board would approve appointments of the Governors 
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of the Reserve Banks, and outlined that it was the duty of the Board to “promote 
conditions making for business stability.”111 Finally, the bill gave the Board full authority 
to change reserve requirements of the member banks.  
 Tile II was sandwiched between the non-controversial Titles I and III. Title I 
provided some changes to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), established 
in 1933, changes the banking world would welcome. Title III provided solutions to 
technical problems the Comptroller of the Currency dearly wanted. President Roosevelt 
acknowledged the controversial nature of Title II. Strongly supported by Eccles, but 
going against the wishes of the President of the FDIC and the Comptroller, Roosevelt 
insisted that the Administration submitted one omnibus bill instead of three separate bills 
making it harder for Congress to reject Title II.   
 Two weeks after introduction of the Banking Act, the House Banking and 
Currency Committee started hearings.
112
 More than twenty people gave their opinions, 
beginning with the three authors of the three Titles. Eccles testified for 10 days and 
suggested several modifications. Most opinions of the other witnesses were positive with 
the exception of the Secretary of the Economists National Committee on Monetary Policy, 
thus confirming Eccles’s bias against professional economists.113 A strong objection to 
Title II also came from the American Bankers Association, which thought it would 
threaten the independence of the Federal Reserve Board. On May 9, to Eccles’s great 
satisfaction, a large majority in the House approved a bill that had a strong resemblance 
to the administration’s bill and included the adaptations put forward by Eccles.   
    Hearings in the Senate did not begin until April. The Senate had delegated 
consideration of the bill to a subcommittee, chaired by Senator Carter Glass. Glass was 
the father of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 establishing the Federal Reserve System. 
He considered himself the Senate’s greatest authority on banking matters. Others 
concurred, or as Eccles remarks, “by unwritten amendment to the Constitution (the 
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Senate) had vested him with veto powers over banking legislation.”114 Senator Glass was 
determined to kill what he called the “Eccles bill.” His determination grew out of his 
opinion that the bill was opposed to the history and tradition of the Democratic Party, and 
was exacerbated by the insults he had received from both the President and Eccles. 
President Roosevelt had not consulted Glass when he nominated Eccles. As Eccles 
admits, he himself aggravated this insult by waiting too long before making an 
appointment with Glass. When that appointment finally took place in December 1934, 
Eccles told Glass about the upcoming bill and promised Glass he would send him a copy 
before the Administration sent the bill to Congress. Eccles did not keep that promise and 
Glass concluded Eccles was a liar. He decided Eccles was a dangerous man, who had 
originated a dangerous bill. His objective became to kill Eccles’s bill.115 
 Glass’s first attempt to do just that failed utterly. Eccles’s nomination as Governor 
was a recess appointment. It still needed the approval of the Senate. Glass delayed the 
vote on Eccles’s confirmation as long as possible. When it occurred, Glass was the only 
Senator to cast an opposing vote. 
 At last, Glass started the hearings on the bill. Going against tradition, he called 
Eccles to the stand only after many witnesses from the banking community had already 
spoken out against Title II. This placed Eccles in a defensive position when it was his 
turn to testify. Glass’s aim was to adopt Title I and III but to refer Title II to a 
commission of experts. In contrast to the House, most witnesses, many with  
“great or near great names in the world of finance,” testified against the bill before the 
Senate Committee. Their most important objection was that the bill would lead to undue 
political dominance of the Federal Reserve Board. They even offered that it would make 
the President a dictator. As well, they claimed that the abrogation of the real bills doctrine 
by introducing “sound assets” as the basis for rediscounting decreased the quality of 
banks’ assets. The financiers put forward that the centralization of the decision-making 
on open market transactions in the Board destroyed regional autonomy. Finally, they said 
the bill embodied an unsound theory and that there was, in fact, no need for a change in 
the structure of the System.
116
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 Eccles did not only make his case before Glass’s subcommittee. He travelled 
widely to defend his bill. He went specifically against his main opponents, the bankers. In 
February 1935, for the first time as Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, he made a 
public appearance, when he addressed the Ohio Bankers Association. In Ohio, without 
the specific scorn he had for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York he presented his 
analysis of the failure of the System, discussed in chapter 3.
117
  
 In June 1935, before the annual Convention of Pennsylvania Bankers, he 
addressed the objections raised during the Senate hearings. He squarely denied that the 
independence of the Board was in danger. On the contrary, he said, the bill strengthened 
its independence. He assured the bankers that the Federal Reserve Board would not be a 
more political body than the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade 
Commission or the Security and Exchange Commission. Pointing at the Bank of England 
as the outstanding example of an independent central bank disregarded its close 
cooperation with the British government. Eccles dismissed the idea that the theoretical 
basis of the bill was unsound, and said that “regulation of the money supply (should be) 
entrusted to a public body,” pointedly referring to the Constitution which empowers the 
Congress to coin money and regulate its value. In Eccles’s opinion, the Congress had 
already delegated this power to the Federal Reserve Board by adopting the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913. Eccles said that the proposed bill would really give this power to 
the Board and in the end the country would achieve business stability. He added that the 
bill would not destroy the regional autonomy of the Reserve Banks since the Board had 
the right to approve the Governor and the Reserve Banks retained jurisdiction over the 
appointment of their own Governors. Finally, he pointed out that the bill did not 
deteriorate the quality of banking assets by basing borrowing from the System on “sound 
assets” because the Reserve Banks, and no longer the Board, would determine the quality 
of the assets used as collateral.
118
  
 Thanks to pressure from President Roosevelt Glass did not succeed in slowing 
down the passage of Title II by referring it to a committee of specialists. On July 2 1935, 
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Glass reported his version of the Banking Act of 1935 to the Senate. Three weeks later 
the Senate passed this Act. It differed significantly from the House version and thus, a 
Conference Committee was necessary to resolve the differences. On August 17, a 
compromise bill was ready and was promptly adopted by House and Senate. That an 
adapted Title II was included despite the resistance from Senator Glass, as well as 
bankers and economists, was, according to Jill Kros, to prevent consideration of 
proposals that went further, for instance proposals that would result in the nationalization 
of the System.
119
  
 President Roosevelt signed the act into law on August 23 during a special 
ceremony in the White House. The two major antagonists, Senator Glass and Governor 
Eccles, were present. The next day Eccles told The Wall Street Journal that he was very 
well satisfied “considering the objectives and purposes…as originally proposed and 
finally enacted.”120 About 15 years later, he would write in Beckoning Frontiers that the 
“upshot of the Conference Committee was a workable bill that set up a far more effective 
banking mechanism … and firmly established the authority of the Federal Reserve 
Board.”121 He recognized he had to be grateful to the House for this revitalization of the 
Federal Reserve System.
122
 
  The final Banking Act of 1935 removed the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Comptroller of the Currency from the Federal Reserve Board. That was something 
neither Eccles nor the House had proposed. It fulfilled a wish of Senator Glass, who had 
attempted from 1933 to remove the Treasury Secretary from the Board.
123
 Because of that 
Henry Morgenthau insisted that the Comptroller of the Currency also disappeared from 
the Board. The name of the Reserve Board changed to the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. The chief executive officers of the Reserve Banks, the 
Governors, now were legitimate. Their title became President and their appointments 
needed the approval of the Board. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), 
consisting of seven members of the Board and five representatives from the various 
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Reserve Banks would decide on open market transactions. This was not what Eccles had 
wanted. He had proposed and the House had agreed, that only the Board could decide on 
open market transactions.  
 Eccles rejoiced nevertheless, that the new law established the Board’s hometown 
Washington as the city of open market decisions and not New York or other Reserve 
Bank cities. The law also provided that open market decisions were binding on all 
Reserve Banks. Within limits, the Board acting independently could decide to change 
reserve requirements of the member banks. Such a change was no longer done only in an 
emergency or only upon the approval of the President. The law did not honor Eccles’s 
proposal to make sound assets the basis for loans to member banks, but instead provided  
that satisfactory paper would do, a compromise that did not kill but did weaken the real 
bills doctrine. Eccles’s greatest disappointment was that the law did not give the System 
the mandate “to promote conditions conducive to business stability.” That had to wait 
until 1946, when the Fair Employment Act prescribed this policy for the whole 
government.      
 Four months after the signing ceremony, Frederick Bradford judged the Banking 
Act of 1935 as “worthy of approbation” and “a far better piece of legislation than might 
have been anticipated.” Centralizing monetary responsibility clearly was an improvement. 
The public would now know where to put the blame. He applauded the removal of the 
Secretary of Treasury and the Comptroller from the Board, considering that this would 
increase the independent position of the Board.
124
        
 Forty years later, Helen Burns concluded, “the Banking Act of 1935...advanced 
the centralization of power and control over banking … lodged responsibility in 
Washington, brought the world of banking firmly in line with the government program of 
monetary management and credit control .… Banks were brought closer to the reality of 
federal supervision. In their opposition … aided by (Senator) Glass ,… the bankers had 
achieved a degree of success. On the whole, however, the administration was by far the 
greater victor.”125  
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  Most important of all was, as Meltzer concludes, “The Act of 1935 permitted the 
Federal Reserve to become a central bank, but the major changes in practice came only 
after World War II and the Korean War.” In 1935, the United States at last had a central 
bank as lender of last resort. The Federal Reserve System changed from an organization 
of twelve relatively independent, privately owned banks and a Board with more of a 
supervisory role than a deciding role, into an organization in which the Board of 
Governors had final control over decisions and the Reserve banks, although still privately 
owned, had a subordinate position. After 1935, every president of a Reserve Bank needed 
the approval of the Board. More importantly, the decisive power in the Federal Open 
Market Committee to determine open market policy shifted to the Board from the twelve 
reserve banks, although all of them could be present at the deliberations and five of them 
continued to have a say in these transactions. Because after the First World War gold had 
lost its determining role the founders of the System had assumed it would have, open 
market transactions had become the most important tool of monetary policy. Would it be 
too speculative to conclude that President Roosevelt allowed Eccles to realize what 
President Jackson denied Nicholas Biddle hundred years before: creating a banker’s bank? 
126
   
 It took another 15 years, however, before the System was free to wield the Open 
Market weapon. Finally, in 1951 the System threw off the yoke it had been under from 
1934 when the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 made the System subservient to the Treasury. 
This act fixed the price of gold at $35 per ounce. It meant a devaluation of the dollar of 
nearly 60%. The Treasury reaped a windfall profit from this raise of the book value of its 
gold stock, enabling it to use $2 billion to establish the Exchange Stabilization Fund. 
With that fund, the Secretary of the Treasury had the means to do what that law also 
authorized him to: maintain complete control of credit conditions. He could even nullify 
the credit policies of the Federal Reserve System. In this way, the Treasury had an 
important say in policies concerning interest rates, money and debt. The Federal Reserve 
System, Meltzer asserts, “paying for its inactivity” in the years before, lost control of 
monetary policy for more than 15 years. It was only in March 1951 that the System was 
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relieved of the Treasury burden and developed into the institution it is today.
127
 Eccles 
played a critical role in that liberation, as we will see in the concluding chapter.  
 The Gold Act was not the only reason that the System was, for many years, in the 
words of Meltzer, “in the back seat.” Eccles’s views were perhaps an even more 
important factor. His views explain “his passivity as head of the Federal Reserve.”128 As 
Eccles argued from 1931 on, the cure for the depression was fiscal policies that put 
money in people’s hands, so they could buy goods and services. With these policies, 
Eccles was sure that under-consumption and unemployment would disappear. In his 
testimony before the House Committee, he clearly stated that he did not believe monetary 
action could resolve the depression. Monetary action could stop an expansion, not a 
recession. Trying to stop a recession through monetary action was like trying to push a 
string.  
 Stopping an expansion was easier because it amounted to pulling a string.
129
 What 
Eccles was stating was later associated with Keynes’s liquidity trap. To Eccles flooding 
the economy with money made no sense when there were no borrowers willing and able 
to borrow because they could not detect a demand for their product. The danger of a 
liquidity trap was excess reserves at the banks, and increased inflation. The only thing the 
System could do during a depression was to keep the interest rates low and stay on the 
alert for inflation, inherent in a too large volume of excess reserves.
130
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According to Eccles, the Federal Reserve System could and should only play a 
supporting role. That is clear from Eccles’s testimony in February 1933, to the Senate 
Finance Committee, when he argued that he believed the Federal Reserve System had “to 
preserve (the) market for the necessary Government financing required to meet its present 
operating deficit … until the beneficial effects of the  … emergency measures are 
realized.”131 He told this to the President in November 1934, when he was talking to the 
President on the reconstruction of the Federal Reserve System. At that time Roosevelt 
was planning to ask for four billion dollars for a work relief program. The System was to 
be the channel to finance this program. Because “the prevailing Reserve set up a group of 
private individuals (who) had the power to block the program” the overhaul of the 
System was urgent.
132
 Eccles did not submit to the leading role of the Treasury under 
pressure, but he willingly supported that role.  
Friedman and Schwarz argue that the “money did not matter” view, as they call 
the shift from monetary to fiscal measures, made the Treasury “the active center of 
monetary policy.” Acting in direct disregard of the view of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, the Federal Reserve refused to use the powers it had to avert the Depression, 
and thus it contributed to the passivity of the System and to “the transfer of power from a 
financial institution in the active center of the country to a political institution  in the 
active political center.” Friedman and Schwartz stress that it was Eccles who placed the 
Federal Reserve Board at the center of power and it was he who promoted the importance 
of deficit spending for recovery. To Friedman and Schwartz it is clear who was 
responsible for passivity in the Federal Reserve System during the New Deal years.
133
       
 The Banking Act took effect on January 1, 1936. Although the Secretary of the 
Treasury had left the Board, because of the Gold Act he could still force the Board of 
Governors to do what he wanted. The most illuminating example of his power is what 
took place around the main issue confronting the Board of Governors in the years 1935-
1939, before financing of the coming war became the most pressing issue of the time.  
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 Due to the high price for gold, set at $35, gold flowed into the United States, 
raising the supply of money. This also served to increase the reserves held within the 
banking system. At the end of 1935, the Board discussed what to do with the increasing 
reserves, fearing that with an expansion of bank credit, the System would not be able to 
control the supply and costs of money. To be able to use in a future contraction the other 
instruments, discount rate and open market transactions, most of the Board members 
preferred higher reserve requirements as the remedy.
134
 
 In the spring of 1936, Eccles discussed the idea of increasing the reserve 
requirements with Morgenthau and Roosevelt. They agreed not to take action before July 
1 to give Treasury the time to complete a financing operation. However, when the Board 
decided to act in July, without giving Morgenthau prior notice, it led to a clash between 
Eccles and Morgenthau. As a result, the two men made an agreement. According to 
Morgenthau, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System would now be partners, a 
relationship that Hyman said “would not qualify for a place in any book of prophecy.”135 
According to Meltzer, “adjunct” was a more appropriate term for the System’s 
position.
136
 
 When Eccles discussed a rise of the reserve requirements with President 
Roosevelt and Secretary Morgenthau, he assured them that interest rates would not rise. 
This was very important to Morgenthau. Eccles knew that to meet the new requirements 
some banks would probably have to sell government securities, which could have a 
negative effect on the price of government bonds or conversely could raise the interest 
rates the government would have to pay for its future borrowings. The System, or more 
specifically the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the bank that still executed the open 
market decisions, could prevent a rise in interest rates if it stood ready to buy the 
government securities banks would have to sell. Eccles said to Roosevelt and 
Morgenthau that “New York” was indeed ready. This first rise of the reserve 
requirements was a success. The bond prices barely moved. 
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  Nonetheless, excess reserves remained high. Thus, at the end of 1936, proposals 
to raise the reserve requirements surfaced again. After consultation and discussion with 
Morgenthau who remained afraid of increasing the costs of government borrowing, the 
Board decided to set the requirements to the maximum level the law would allow in two 
equal steps by May 1, 1937. On March 1, the Board took the first step. Unexpectedly, 
bond prices decreased, mainly because the Federal Reserve Bank of New York did not 
buy enough government securities to prevent the decline. Morgenthau was very upset. 
After a heated discussion, in which Morgenthau threatened to use his Stabilization Fund 
to restore the bond prices, Eccles asked President Roosevelt to preserve the System’s 
right of open market operations. When it was the time for the second step on May 1, the 
System bought the necessary volume of bonds.
137
 
 Eccles does not write much on the issue of reserve requirements in Beckoning 
Frontiers. In his description of the period between 1935 and 1939, he clearly shows that 
he was more interested in fiscal policy than in monetary policy. He defended the 
Roosevelt Administration against the bankers, but abstained from speeches during the 
presidential campaign of 1936. Eccles gives more attention to the nomination of the new 
Board of Governors of the System. In cooperation with President Roosevelt, Eccles 
tricked Senator Glass into nominating the men Eccles wanted. He moved into the terrain 
of Morgenthau when he involved himself in discussion on the undistributed profit tax, 
which, as he himself writes, offended Morgenthau deeply. During this entire time, Eccles 
tried in vain to convince President Roosevelt of the necessity of unification, meaning that 
every bank, national or state, should be member of the System.
138
 
 The only monetary issue Eccles describes indeed is the question of the increase of 
the reserve requirements. He devotes a few pages of Beckoning Frontiers to why the 
requirements had to be higher. His analysis is the same as Meltzer’s. He does not mention 
the “partner deal” with Morgenthau after the first increase of the reserve requirements on 
July 1 1936. However, he honestly hints at the tensions with Morgenthau that developed 
after the raise of March 1, 1937, and mentions he needed the President to prevent 
Morgenthau from acting on his own, and that the price was that the FOMC had to bow to 
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the wishes of Morgenthau. Eccles devotes far more space to explaining why that increase 
was not the cause of the “Roosevelt Recession” of 1937-1938, which is what Morgenthau 
argued.
139
 The next chapter will elaborate on this issue. 
 From 1934 until 1951, the Treasury, not the Federal Reserve System, pulled the 
strings of monetary matters. The Gold Reserve Act had given the Secretary of the 
Treasury the authority to overrule decisions of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. More important is Eccles’s view that only fiscal policy, not monetary 
policy should or could solve the problems of the Depression. Eccles always saw the 
System in a supporting role compared to the Treasury. The Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve System were mountain climbers tied together with a single rope. The Federal 
System had to promote the most favorable monetary and credit conditions for Treasury’s 
spending, taxing and borrowing policies.
140
 
 Meltzer is right that the System was in the backseat during the Depression years. 
However, as Matias Vernengo argues, this was not because Eccles was a passive, 
subservient, “hands-off” central banker, who “submitted without a fight to the directions 
of the Treasury,” but because he saw the System as “the fiscal agent of the Treasury in a 
situation that only expansionary fiscal policy could turn the economy around.”141 The 
increase in the reserve requirements can be seen as proof of Eccles’s non-passivity. He 
and the Board preferred using the new instrument that the Banking Act had given them to 
control the money supply in order to have a better position to use at a later stage, the 
other instruments – open market transactions and the discount rate.142 When the times 
changed after the Second World War, Eccles led the fight to remove the Federal Reserve 
from the back seat and seat it prominently in the front of the car driving policy action. 
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Chapter 4. The Struggle with Henry Morgenthau and the “Roosevelt Recession” of 
1937 
“The situation today is too serious for us to rely on wishful thinking. A drastic and long-
continued recession at this time will discredit the whole New Deal. … If effective action 
is again delayed at this time, the repercussions on our whole social, political and 
economic structure may be disastrous.”143 Eccles wrote this strong warning to President 
Roosevelt on October 31, 1937. It was his opening salvo in what Stein somewhat 
melodramatically calls the “struggle for the soul of FDR.” In his memorandum with this 
warning, Eccles gave advice
 
on how the Administration should react to the recession that 
had begun in September 1937.
144
 
 There were several different views on the causes of the recession, and just as 
many ideas for its solution. Stein distinguishes five anti-recession possibilities that are 
more or less congruent with the five approaches or groups that Brinkley and Meltzer 
describe. The President would try all of them before, after six agonizing months, he 
settled on one.  
 The view most commonly found in business organizations was that punitive taxes, 
specifically the undistributed profits tax, as well as restrictive legislation and an anti-
business attitude of the Administration were to blame. For businessmen the solution was 
clear: dismantle all elements of the New Deal that restricted the freedom of private 
enterprise. This was the only solution the President refused to apply out of hand.   
 In contrast to the business community, there was the view that blamed the 
recession on “monopolistic powers”, accusing them of artificially raising prices and 
keeping wages low. This view held that the government had to further restrict free 
enterprise through more regulation  
 A third view was that the problem stemmed from excessive competition, 
considered wasteful in most of its forms. The solution put forward was cooperation 
between business, labor and government, either voluntarily or carried out under the 
guidance of the government through a planning board. President Hoover had tried the 
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voluntary version. The planning board version had produced the National Recovery 
Administration, until the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional.  
 The fourth view was that for recovery the budget should be in balance. 
Expenditures would not exceed revenues. Of this view, Morgenthau was the main 
proponent. In contrast, the last view was to engage in deficit spending where 
expenditures would exceed revenues, if seen to be necessary for recovery. This was the 
view that Eccles propagated.  
 Six months later, in April 1938, President Roosevelt sided with Eccles. First in a 
message to Congress and later in a Fireside Chat, he announced a program of action 
involving more than $4 billion in government expenditures. He sounded truly “Ecclesian” 
when he said that the cause of the recession was the lack of purchasing power of the 
people. In January 1939, the President submitted a budget for the fiscal year 1940, 
declaring that the Administration had checked the recession in the previous year because 
of increased expenditures and, again, channeling the spirit of Eccles, Roosevelt said that a 
balanced budget could not be reached by slashing expenditures or increasing taxes.
145
   
 Morgenthau suffered his most devastating defeat at the hand of a man whose 
governmental career he had himself decisively influenced. How could it be that 
Morgenthau was the man who first appointed Eccles as his assistant, and then nominated 
him as Governor of the Federal Reserve System, when Eccles was a man with views on 
fiscal policy so very different from his own?  
 When, in November 1933, Morgenthau became Secretary of the Treasury, the 
New Dealers, who, in the same month, had heard Eccles’s views, wanted to surround 
Morgenthau with people representing their views on deficit spending. Thus, they brought 
Eccles to the attention of Morgenthau, who was desperately looking for people with good 
qualities. After some difficult discussions, Eccles became Morgenthau’s assistant on 
monetary and credit matters. The discussions were difficult, not because their views on 
how to solve the economic problems were different, but because of the vagueness of the 
job Morgenthau offered to Eccles. Apparently, they started their cooperation without 
having actually told each other their views on fiscal policy. Neither Eccles nor 
Morgenthau writes of any discussion whatsoever on their different ideas at that time. 
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Blum only writes that Eccles came to Washington as “special assistant to Morgenthau on 
housing.”146 
 Hyman concludes that “out of this strained beginning” Morgenthau and Eccles 
“were destined to have a long and ever-changing relationship with each other…full of 
accords, cross-tensions, of felicity and hard infighting, which left their imprints on the 
economic and political life of the nation during the length of Roosevelt’s presidency, and 
afterwards as well.”147 Soon it would be apparent that the most important cause of their 
strained relationship was their principal, diametrically opposed view on what fiscal policy 
would combat the Depression, no doubt exacerbated by their personalities. 
 Morgenthau believed throughout his whole life that a balanced budget would be 
the instrument of recovery. “Progress toward a balanced budget would … win the 
confidence of private enterprise (which would) result in an upturn of private investment 
that would sustain a new prosperity.” Morgenthau saw a balanced budget not only as an 
economic or financial necessity, but also as a moral exigency. A national budget was still 
a relatively new phenomenon during the Depression years. It was one of the last results of 
the Progressive Movement, which promoted it as a means to have a better, cleaner, more 
efficient and open government. The war deficits growing out of WWI were the last push 
for Congress to adopt the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The budget reform 
movement deeply influenced Morgenthau and Franklin Roosevelt as well. A balanced 
budget became for Morgenthau not only a sign of the economic health of America but 
also a measure of good government. To him balancing the budget of the nation was not 
different from balancing the budget of his farm. It was a sure sign of good 
management.
148
  
 Morgenthau combined this economic orthodoxy with “humanitarianism in social 
policy.” When he considered a depression or recession, he first saw the human suffering 
it brought. He supported programs to provide welfare, labor regulations and assistance to 
farmers. He was one of the architects of social security legislation. This compassion 
made him sensitive to relief programs in such a way that, years later, Harry Hopkins 
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would express his gratitude to Morgenthau for being a great friend to those who had little 
in life.
149
 He gained this social responsibility while working at the Henry Street 
Settlement in New York.
150
 Thus, Morgenthau was a man with ”Zwei Seelen in einer 
Brust,” who saw it as a moral obligation to prevent deficits, but who also demonstrated 
great care for the needy. It must have saddened him deeply that never during his tenure 
did he have a budget in balance.  
 The core of their difference of opinion was that Morgenthau thought recovery or 
prosperity would come from a balanced budget, while Eccles argued that a balanced 
budget would be the result of recovery or prosperity. Both men exacerbated their 
differences on fiscal policy by their propensity to personalize them. Behind each 
difference of opinion, they saw personal motives. Although “quickly conscious of 
Eccles’s large talents,” Morgenthau saw Eccles as confident, self-assertive, ambitious, 
energetic  and as having “an insatiable drive to gain personal power.” When they clashed 
on the first increase of the reserve requirements, Morgenthau confided in his diary, “I can 
not make out Eccles unless he wanted to be important and show his independence.” 
Eccles attributed his difficulties with Morgenthau to the “quirks of (his) personality,” 
only to discover that he had the same problems with Morgenthau’s successors. What 
exactly these quirks were, neither Eccles nor Hyman ever made clear.
151
 
 Certainly by the time he suggested to Roosevelt that he nominated Eccles to be 
Governor of the Federal Reserve System, Morgenthau had gained more knowledge of 
Eccles’ views and personality. Neither Eccles and his biographer Hyman, nor 
Morgenthau and his biographer Blum, write anything about the motives of Morgenthau in 
nominating Eccles. Was it to promote Eccles to a position where he could no longer 
bother Morgenthau with his tireless deficit spending arguments? Was it that Eccles would 
have only limited power on monetary matters at the Federal Reserve due to the Gold Act? 
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Was it because Morgenthau, as Blum asserts, “above the clerical level … made merit the 
basis for his selections”?152  
 Perhaps Morgenthau had all these considerations in his mind. More likely or 
plausible, however, is that Morgenthau simply saw Eccles as the man who was able to 
realize his deeply cherished wish: the reform of the Federal Reserve System. To keep the 
costs of interest on government securities as low as possible, Morgenthau needed the 
cooperation of the Federal Reserve System, specifically the Open Market Policy 
Committee. The OMPC refused to cooperate. Just like Eccles, Morgenthau thought he 
did not get that cooperation because the New York private banks dominated the OMPC 
and the Federal Reserve Board. As we have seen, after only a few months at the Treasury 
Department, Eccles became convinced of the necessity of the reconstruction of the 
System. It is not too speculative to suppose that not only Currie, but also Morgenthau 
influenced Eccles in this. Thus, it is not surprising that Morgenthau would nominate a 
man he saw as an ally that could help him get a grip on the Federal Reserve System. The 
fact that President Roosevelt agreed to Eccles’s nomination and appointed him is due to 
Morgenthau’s special relationship with the President, as Blum makes clear in The 
Morgenthau Diaries. Morgenthau was one of the few persons Roosevelt completely 
trusted. In addition, that Eccles was a westerner, an entrepreneur, and a banker who had 
saved his own banks presented the President an opportunity to show that not all New 
Dealers were “crackpots and visionaries … who never had met a pay roll.”153   
 If Morgenthau did in fact have the illusion that once Eccles became chair of the 
Board of Governors he would or could no longer bother him with his views, he was in for 
a big disappointment. In 1935 Eccles was busy getting the Banking Bill adopted and 
filling the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System with men, suitable to him, 
the President and Senator Glass.  
 In January 1936, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the tax that 
provided the Agricultural Adjustment Administration the funds for payments to farmers. 
In addition, over the veto of the President, Congress resolved to pay out the promised 
bonuses to the veterans of the First World War. This created a gap of more than $600 
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million in the budget. True to the doctrine of the balanced budget, the Treasury had to 
find new revenues and thus proposed to levy taxes on undistributed profits. Undistributed 
profits were profits not paid out as dividends by companies to their shareholders.  
Therefore, they were not subject to the income tax. According to Meltzer, the “peculiar” 
belief was that corporations did not use these undistributed profits.
154
 Treasury assumed 
that, by taxing those profits, its revenues would increase, either when those profits 
remained unused through the new tax or when paid out through the income tax. Eccles 
supported this new tax not because of the assumptions of the Treasury, but because it 
would stimulate spending.
155
  
 The House of Representatives reported a bill along the lines of the Treasury, 
which only aimed to raise more revenues and nothing else. When this bill met resistance 
in the Senate, Eccles proposed amendments, which President Roosevelt promptly sent to 
the Senate, thus suggesting that Eccles’s version of the bill would replace the Treasury 
version. As Eccles admitted, Morgenthau was deeply offended by this trespass on his 
territory. By the end, in May 1936, the President had signed an act that satisfied nobody, 
most of all not Eccles. Specifically annoying to him was that between his name and the 
tax there now was an inextricable link. The next clash with Morgenthau occurred a few 
months later. The occasion was the rise of the reserve requirements, discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
 At the end of 1936, the stage was set for the final act in the battle between Eccles 
and Morgenthau. In December, Eccles learned from the President that he planned to 
submit a balanced budget for fiscal 1938. Eccles immediately expressed his dissent and 
sent a memorandum in which he explained his objections. When, a few days later, 
Morgenthau visited the White House, the President, as Blum writes, tossed Eccles’s 
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memorandum to him with the order to do something with it. Morgenthau concluded that 
he had to destroy Eccles’s point of view, otherwise Eccles would become the President’s 
most important fiscal adviser. Fortunately for Morgenthau, he was able to do that. 
Revised budget estimates showed that a balanced budget was possible. The President was 
very happy with this escape. It meant the defeat of Eccles. President Roosevelt submitted 
a budget that would be in balance if debt retirement was not taken into account, and if 
Congress accepted that relief expenditures remained below $1.5 billion. The President 
predicted that the budget would be completely in balance in fiscal 1939.
156
  
   Morgenthau seemed to have beaten Eccles definitively. On April 12, 1937, 
Eccles issued a statement, which appeared to be his complete surrender. Referring to the 
already announced increase of the reserve requirements of which the second step would 
take place on May 1, 1937, he stated that after the increase of the reserve requirements 
there would be enough funds to encourage the recovery. In addition, he declared that, 
“under the present conditions … a balanced recovery must be accompanied by a prompt 
balancing of the Federal Budget.”157  
 This statement came a week after Morgenthau, according to Blum, ecstatically 
would have told his staff about the way the President had rebuked Eccles on April 5 on 
balancing the budget. The day after that event Eccles supposedly went to Morgenthau to 
tell him he was converted, and to ask him to join him to impress on the President the 
urgency of a balanced budget. To Morgenthau this was an “ephemeral recantation.”158 
This story is too good to be true. As Stein rightly argues, it is “hard to reconcile with … 
the minutes (of) the Federal Open Market Committee of March 13 and 15.”159 In those 
meetings, the FOMC discussed the consequences of the first step of the raise of reserve 
requirements. During a part of the discussions, during which Morgenthau was present, 
Eccles said that it was imperative to balance the budget in 1938. On March 15, Eccles left 
the meeting to have a telephone conversation with Morgenthau. When he came back, he 
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reported to his colleagues that on the subject of the perennial concern of Morgenthau – 
the price of government securities – Morgenthau did not disagree with his opinion that “if 
the government would balance the budget and deal effectively with labor and armament 
problems there was no question…that the price of government securities would increase 
or decline.”160  Thus, Eccles’s statement of April 12, 1937 is in line with the FOMC 
minutes of March 13 and 15. In addition, when he agreed with Morgenthau that the 
government also had to deal with labor problems, he was referring to his discussion with 
the President on March 11.  
 At the beginning of March 1937, it was clear that in the first quarter revenues 
would be lower than estimated. In April, the President would order the government 
agencies to hold expenditures. The president asked Eccles what he thought of the 
economic situation. Eccles warned that “unjustifiable price rises, excessive profits and 
unreasonable labor demands” threatened the prospects for stability. He even said the 
same thing in a press statement a few days after he had his talk with the President, 
because the press had drawn wrong conclusions from their meeting.
161
  
 Eccles and Hyman are not very clear on what precisely happened. Neither writes a 
word about a discussion or a rebuke on April 5, nor do they mention the statement of 
April 12. Hyman does report that Eccles told Morgenthau it was imperative to have a 
balanced budget, but gives the wrong date for this event, and gives no reason why Eccles 
would say such a thing. Eccles himself is very silent on this topic in Beckoning Frontiers. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, when bond prices declined after the first raise of the 
reserve requirements, Eccles needed the President to intervene to save the Federal 
Reserve System role in monetary policy from being totally taken over by the Treasury. 
Was appeasing Morgenthau the reason for Eccles’s provisional admission of defeat, and 
his temporary “conversion?”  
 It was not, if one accepts the view of Mark Nelson, that Eccles was in the camp of 
the budget balancers for the whole of 1937. Describing what happened in 1937, Nelson 
argues, “The fact is … that Eccles stood with Morgenthau on fiscal matters from the very 
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beginning of the slump and throughout the remainder of 1937.”162 Nelson accuses Eccles 
of trying to hide this in Beckoning Frontiers to safeguard his reputation and burnish his 
image as dissenting voice in 1937. However, Nelson refers to press reports on a speech 
Eccles delivered in November 1936, and not to the speech itself. In that speech Eccles 
told an assembly of Boston bankers that he believed, “a balanced budget will be reached 
by 1938.”163 Nelson’s interpretation is that Eccles was insincere in Beckoning Frontiers 
when he wrote that in the spring of 1937, “It did seem that the recovery movement was 
secure … (and) the private economic engine had gained enough momentum to move 
forward without the aid of a government tow car.”164 Eccles writes this when he is 
discussing the memorandum he left with the President after their meeting on March 11.  
Nelson argues that, by leaving out the first sentence of the quote from this memorandum 
– “the recovery movement is now assured and requires no further positive stimulation by 
government,” – Eccles implied that it was others who no longer saw the need for the 
government as tow car, but that he was not among them.
165
 
 Nelson’s interpretation is questionable. In his speech to the Boston bankers, 
Eccles also said that, “(w)e should be ready to incur a budgetary deficit” when 
unemployment increases.
166
 In his March 11 memorandum to the President, he wrote that 
there was no need for further stimulation of the economy. He did not say that there was 
no need for stimulation at all. Nelson seems to forget that Eccles always maintained that 
in prosperous times, when unemployment was at low levels, the budget should not only 
be in balance, but should have a surplus to pay off the national debt.
167
 He alluded to this 
very idea in his speech to the Boston bankers.                
 As Blum concludes, “The summer of 1937 was the sunniest season Morgenthau 
had known for many years.”168 On April 20, 1937, the President, on the advice of 
Morgenthau, told Congress “I am convinced that the success of our whole program and 
the permanent security of our people demand that we adjust all expenditures within the 
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limits of my budget estimate.” May calls this “the strongest statement the President ever 
made on the importance of balancing the budget.”169 The President seemed to have given 
Morgenthau everything he asked for. Confident that he now was the “principal shaper of 
New Deal fiscal policy,” Morgenthau accepted an invitation to address the Academy of 
Political Science in November, a gathering of businessmen, politicians and academicians. 
He thought it would be the ideal forum in which to pronounce that a balanced budget was 
the government’s principal premise of fiscal policy.170 
 Morgenthau’s sunny summer ended at the end of September 1937. In August, the 
economy started to contract. In October, that contraction hit the stock market. On October 
19, “Black Tuesday,” President Roosevelt had his own Wall Street Crash. It was 1929 all 
over again. Just as in 1929, the stock market crash went along with a dramatic economic 
down turn. At the end of 1937, industrial production declined by 40% and the national 
income by 13%. 4 million people were added to the rolls of the still great mass of 
unemployed.
171
  
 Until October 19, Morgenthau rejoiced that the President was keeping the faith. A 
week before this date Morgenthau had received disturbing figures from his Research 
Division. A trusted New York financier had told him of ominous developments in the 
stock market. Morgenthau chose to ignore this and other bad news. It even made him 
more determined. Strongly supported by Morgenthau, the President also remained 
determined to have his budget in balance in fiscal 1938, writing on October 14 to his 
Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace to tell him to avoid “a program which would 
unbalance the budget.”172  
 October 19, 1937 was the first day in a six-month period that would end with the 
most devastating defeat for Morgenthau during his tenure as Secretary of the Treasury. 
For Morgenthau, developments of October 19 “precipitated a policy crisis (that) shook 
Roosevelt’s faith in budget balancing and gained a hearing for the advocates of 
countercyclical spending.” One of those “preaching that gospel” of course was Eccles.173 
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 When Morgenthau noted the shift in the President’s views he became determined 
to settle the matter in his speech to the Academy of Political Science on November 10. 
He spent many hours with his staff on this speech, and they constructed a message 
predicting that the recovery would continue and the budget would be in balance, not only 
in fiscal 1938, but also for the remaining fiscal years of President Roosevelt’s term in 
office. After October 19, Morgenthau had to decide whether he would deliver the speech 
now that a full-blown recession was going on. Fiscal 1938 and even fiscal 1939 
threatened not to be in balance. He took the decision to stress that a balanced budget was 
necessary to combat the recession. He would put his neck out and declare that the 
Administration saw a balanced budget as a commitment, without “ifs or buts.” He felt 
that would create the confidence business needed to engage in the necessary spending.
174
 
 Then, on November 3, the President asked if Morgenthau had seen Eccles’s 
program. Eccles had offered a program of concrete actions just days before on October 
31. The next day Eccles and Morgenthau had a meeting. On several issues, they agreed, 
but not, however, on the content of speech. To Eccles it was necessary to speed up 
expenditures to stop deflation. He insisted the speech was deflationary and that 
Morgenthau should not give it. Supported by his staff, Morgenthau decided to ignore 
Eccles’s objections. The only man who could prevent Morgenthau from delivering the 
speech was the President. On November 6 the President reviewed the final draft and 
made several amendments, inserting precisely the “ifs and buts” Morgenthau had wanted 
to avoid. He accepted the presidential loopholes and delivered the speech a few days later.        
 The speech was a disaster. Preceding Morgenthau was Senator Harry Byrd. He 
drew applause when he heavily criticized the government for its disastrous deficits. He 
created a negative atmosphere for Morgenthau by stating that the Treasury Department 
had disguised the truth of the financial situation by deliberately misrepresenting 
expenditures and the national debt.
175
  
 Standing as a representative of what Senator Byrd had described as a fraudulent 
institution Morgenthau was at a disadvantage when it was his turn to speak. There was 
cynical laughter when he said, “We deliberately used an unbalanced Federal Budget 
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during the past four years to meet a great emergency. That emergency … no longer 
exists .… I am aware further that some persons contend that another great spending 
program is desirable to ward off the risk of another business depression. … (T)he 
domestic problems which face us today are essentially different from those faced us four 
year ago…. Many measures are required for their solutions. One of these measures, but 
only one in the present juncture is a determined movement toward a balanced budget. ... 
We believe that much of the remaining unemployment will disappear as private capital 
funds are increasingly employed. … (O)ne of the most important ways of achieving these 
ends at this time is to continue progress toward a balance of the Federal Budget.”176  
Interpreting the laughter as the symbol of the temper and disbelief of his audience, 
Morgenthau was confounded by the reception from the men he was trying to help. One of 
his assistants concluded that it was hopeless to try to work with those who seemed to be 
typical leaders of American finance.
177
 According to Stein, the laughter was no 
coincidence. Business simply did not believe the promise of a balanced budget would 
ever be realized. Moreover, a balanced budget was not its highest priority. Repeal of the 
undistributed tax and a moderated labor policy was.
178
  
 Morgenthau’s speech was a deep shock to Eccles. He did not understand why the 
President had allowed Morgenthau to give it. Eccles thought that he had won over the 
President to his views just two days before. When he was writing Beckoning Frontiers in 
1951, Eccles realized that the President had still been uncertain at that time on the right 
direction and had therefore assented to two contradictory policies.
179
  
 Nevertheless, starting with the memorandum of October 31, 1937, Eccles had 
sown doubt with the President about the veracity of budget balancing. That message 
appealed to the President because it gave advice about what to do, in contrast with 
Morgenthau who submitted nothing more than drafts of his speech. Eccles’s 
memorandum was an action program. Without action, the memorandum said, a balanced 
budget in 1939 would be impossible, the recession would continue, and discredit the New 
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Deal, taking down with it the Democratic Party, just as had happened to the Republican 
Party in 1929-1933. The social, political and economic repercussions would be disastrous.  
 The first action Eccles advised was to create a proper psychological atmosphere 
through reassurances to the business community and an increase in wages to reflect rising 
productivity. Second, Eccles thought that government should maintain consumer income 
and buying power by increasing government expenditures. Third, he recommended a 
housing program that would aim at lowering building costs and providing lower cost 
mortgages in order to stimulate private expenditures. Eccles promoted another stimulus: a 
temporary amendment to the undistributed profit tax, exempting 90% of the corporations. 
This was in the memorandum that Roosevelt tossed to Morgenthau on November 3.
180
 
 On November 8, Eccles was at the White House for another meeting with the 
President to discuss a memorandum on the causes of the recession and its cures. Isadore 
Lubin of the Department of Commerce, Leon Henderson of the Works Progress 
Administration, and Eccles’s assistant, Laughlin Currie had authored this memorandum. 
May is right when he concludes that this memo was “very similar in tone and analysis” to 
Eccles’s October 31 memorandum, including even its recommendations. The most 
plausible explanation for the similarity in the two documents, of course, is that Currie 
was co-author of both documents. More importantly, it shows that Eccles had allies in 
other government institutions. To Eccles the President seemed to accept the arguments of 
these memoranda and the advised actions. Then on November 10, the day of 
Morgenthau’s speech, the President also gave his approval to Eccles’s housing program, 
giving Eccles every reason to think he had won “the Soul of FDR.”181  
 In Eccles’s view, what were the causes of the recession? Certainly, it was not the 
increase of the reserve requirements, because with the increase there was no credit 
restriction nor was there any rise in interest rates. The recession was due to decreasing 
government spending. In 1936, the government paid veterans an amount of $1.7 billion. 
In 1937, the Social Security Act came into force, taking from the consumers $2 billion in 
social security taxes. These two measures taken together reduced consumer income by 
nearly $4 billion in 1937. In 1936, businesses had built up their inventory because they 
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were afraid of future price rises and delivery problems due to the National Labor 
Relations Act, adopted in 1935. In 1937, they dumped those inventories onto the market, 
and as a result had to restrict production.
182
  
 Meltzer does not agree. He holds that sales declined because the supply of money 
declined which led to diminishing inventories. As well, Meltzer thinks the anti-business 
rhetoric the President engaged in and regulatory actions were factors. Friedman and 
Schwartz blame the 1937 recession on wrong monetary policies of which the increase of 
reserve requirements was the most important one.
183
 Although this view is widely 
accepted, there was, there still is disagreement over it. In 1951, Philip Bell concluded, 
“the culpability of Federal Reserve Authorities cannot be shown.184 Charles Calomiris 
and David Wheelock, in a study done as recently as 2011, support Eccles’s interpretation 
of the non-effects of the higher reserve requirements, drawing the conclusion that 
doubling reserve requirements was not a main cause of the 1937 recession.
185
 
 For both Eccles and Morgenthau the months after November 10 were distressing. 
Morgenthau was afraid the President would approve new expenditures. Eccles was afraid 
he would wait too long to do just that. Both kept sending memoranda with their 
arguments to the President. May observes that with these documents Eccles at least kept 
the President aware that there were alternatives to budget balancing, anti-monopoly 
measures, central planning or voluntary cooperation. More importantly, as May argues, 
Eccles became the ideological leader of a group, which met on a regular basis to discuss 
how to rescue the New Deal. Besides Eccles, although not always present, the most 
important member was Harry Hopkins, head of the relief organization the Works 
Progress Administration (WPA). Already a trusted adviser to the President when 
Roosevelt was governor of New York, Hopkins would soon become his main adviser. 
His access to Roosevelt matched that of Morgenthau. Because of that, he came to play a 
pivotal role in Roosevelt final decision. Other members of this group were the three 
authors of the November 8 memorandum, Senator Robert LaFollette, Henry Wallace and 
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Harry Dexter White, the future counterpart of Keynes in the negotiations on the 
International Monetary Fund. The aim of the group was to develop a common approach 
on which all could agree and represented such a broad spectrum within the government 
that any argument it made would convince the President. Another important ally was the 
President’s son James, who at that time was his secretary. James Roosevelt and Eccles 
met weekly.
186
 
 In mid-February 1938, Eccles sent an “Outline of a Tentative Program to Combat 
the Recession” to the President. He had already sent it to James Roosevelt to discuss with 
Hopkins. In this document, he confirmed the position he had taken in the October 31 
memorandum restating that a serious depression was possible and a natural upturn in the 
economy would not happen. He said that events since October had strengthened his 
position. “(W)e appear to be launched on a severe depression.” He again made the case 
that Government had to turn the tide, and that leadership could only come from the 
Administration through providing Congress with a reflation program. Eccles was clearly 
playing on the growing fear the President had of fascism. Referring to the rise of fascism 
with its demonstrated strong leadership, Eccles said that democracy also had to have 
leadership to show that it could work. A couple of months before, Cetulio Vargas had 
taken over Brazil and Hitler was demanding Austria’s “Anschluss.”187   
 The President made the decision to resume spending at the end of March 1938 at 
his retreat in Warm Springs, Georgia. On March 12, Austria became a part of Germany. 
On March 25, the stock market took a dive. The 1938 elections were forthcoming. The 
president felt he had to act before Congress recessed. Crucial elements of note in this 
decision were the absence of Morgenthau and the presence of Hopkins in Warm Springs. 
Supported by three experts, Hopkins persuaded  or, as Morgenthau saw it, “stampeded” 
Roosevelt to spend America out of the recession.  
 Returning to Washington, the President started to work on a message to Congress, 
in which he would unfold his program. On April 10, 1938, Roosevelt told a bewildered 
Morgenthau what he proposed to say to Congress a few days later. In vain, Morgenthau 
tried to dissuade Roosevelt from his plans. Morgenthau threatened to resign, justly hurt 
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that the President had decided on a fiscal policy without consulting him, and which, more 
to the point, repudiated him. The President did not budge. Although he saw it as the 
blackest hour in his career, Morgenthau did not in fact resign. He realized he and 
Roosevelt agreed on most other broad issues.
188
 
 On April 14, the President announced his program to Congress. On the same day 
in a Fireside Chat, his first in six months, he informed the American people of his 
decision. The total amount involved in the fiscal package was more than $4 billion, to 
spend on relief through the WPA, on public works and on expansion of credit through a 
reduction of reserve requirements and an increase in the money supply. This last Eccles 
reluctantly agreed upon and Morgenthau welcomed enthusiastically. For the time being, a 
balanced budget was out of sight. For the rest of his life, Morgenthau would deplore the 
fact that the President had not given a balanced budget a chance in 1938. In June, 
Congress approved Roosevelt’s proposals. Over the objections of Roosevelt, it also 
reduced the capital gains and undistributed profits tax, and provided that the undistributed 
tax would expire at the end of 1939.
189
  
 Clearly, the “spenders” had triumphed and the “budget balancers” had been 
defeated. Does that mean that the triumph was so total that only Keynesian principles 
from then on would determine fiscal policy? Certainly, as Stein argues, “the experience 
of 1937 and 1938 was critical for the development of American fiscal policy. … It 
demonstrated the powerful effect of changes in the budget position upon the 
economy.”190 It was the last time a President would try to cut expenditures during a 
recession. From 1938 on, the accepted idea was that to combat a recession the 
government had to expand its budget and cut taxes.  
 In the second half of 1938, a recovery started though it did not lead to full 
employment. Roosevelt himself thought more was necessary to reach that goal. 
Government spending was just one part of the solution. At the same time as he proposed 
his recovery program, the President ordered the Justice Department to investigate the 
Concentration of Economic Power. He also remained interested in voluntary cooperation. 
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He even felt guilt about the deficits he had produced every year of his presidency. 
Roosevelt remained doubtful of deficit spending and Morgenthau continued to strengthen 
those misgivings. In the autumn of 1938, the President was shocked to see the forecast of 
the expenditures for fiscal 1940. Deficits remained a sensitive subject not only to the 
President, but to the public at large. The public’s faith in a balanced budget persisted. In a 
March 1939 survey, a 61% majority affirmed the statement that the government should 
reduce its expenditures to a level that would bring the budget into balance. Further, the 
1938 elections were a disaster for the Democratic Party. It lost 80 seats in the House and 
8 in the Senate. Congress had turned conservative. The belief that there were other ways 
to stimulate the economy than to spend, gained momentum. When in the spring of 1939 
the President again asked to increase government expenditures, Congress refused. It did 
not help that Congress was being asked to fund projects at a lower cost than private 
lenders would have done. Congress was prepared to accept deficits to come out of a 
recession, but not to allow the government to replace private investors. It was Roosevelt’s 
first defeat on fiscal policy.
191
        
 In Beckoning Frontiers, Eccles somewhat bitterly admits that he had not won 
what he wanted. His conception was that a government “uses its system of taxes and 
expenditures…for the purpose of maintaining economic stability through maximum 
production and employment.” In the depression years, a proper fiscal policy called for 
large … deficits. … Throughout the decade, however, we remained in a state of semi-
depression because we were not willing to have … sufficient expenditures to employ our 
idle man power and resources. … At no time we had less than eight to ten million 
unemployed. We were never able to take up the large amount of slack that existed 
throughout the economy.”192  
 Brinkley is clear. The 1938 spending program was not an all-out victory for 
Eccles’s views. It was, however, an important step in the direction of Eccles’s 
compensatory fiscal policy. It was only “an augury of the timid, halfhearted way in which 
Americans would embrace Keynesianism for most of the next forty years.” The 
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institutional reforms necessary to enable the government to stimulate the economy very 
quickly never followed.
193
 
 In 1933, Eccles had asked the Senate Finance Committee, why an unbalanced 
budget was not a problem during the First World War, why a national debt of $27 billion 
did not impair the credit of the government, and why at that time there was no 
unemployment. It must have been a frustrating and sad experience for Eccles that World 
War II made deficits and a rapidly growing national debt acceptable again, and that only 
with that war did unemployment nearly disappear, so showing the potential of a deficit 
spending fiscal policy.  
 
Conclusion: Eccles legacy. The System “in the front seat” and the “compensatory 
finance” standard doctrine 
When Marriner Eccles resigned from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, on July 15, 1951, he did so not as chairman but as an ordinary member. In 
January 1948, President Harry Truman had refused to reappoint Eccles. Although 
bewildered by Truman’s decision, Eccles had stayed on the Board. According to Eccles, 
the President did not reappoint him, because the Board had decided to pursue antitrust 
action against A.P Giannini’s Transamerica Corporation. This banking organization had a 
“tremendous” influence in California and four other states.194 Sandra Weldin reaffirms 
this suspicion. She refers to a justifying letter of President Truman, which Eccles never 
saw. Besides the Transamerica suit, the President stated in this letter that Eccles had 
violated the law by remaining chairman, president or director of several of his 
companies.
195
  
 His main reason for remaining was the on-going struggle to free the System from 
the Treasury’s grip. The Secretary of the Treasury, taking his authority from the Gold 
Reserve Act of 1934, had enacted monetary policy without considering the views of the 
Federal Reserve System. There also had been an agreement in 1942 to peg the long-term 
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interest rate to a low 2.5% in order to finance World War II. During the war, the System 
had no room to maneuver whatsoever.  
 Eccles supported the view that, in a situation that only fiscal policy could turn the 
economy around, the Federal Reserve System acted as the fiscal agent of the Treasury. 
The Second World War changed that situation. Eccles saw that the War was the cure for 
the Depression. Unemployment disappeared and prices rose rapidly. An awareness grew 
for Eccles and the Board that it was now time “to pull the string” to prevent galloping 
inflation. The Secretary of the Treasury, first Fred Vinson, and then John W. Snyder both 
of whom succeeded Morgenthau when he left in 1945, consistently refused to change 
course. Eccles feared that continuing to cooperate with Treasury, as the System had done 
since 1934 would make the System “an engine of inflation.”196 Although the System did 
gain some flexibility after 1945, it could not come to agreement with the Treasury to 
abandon the 2.5% interest rate, and let interest rates rise. A rise of the interest rate was 
not in the interests of Treasury, which had to manage a national debt of almost $300 
billion and wanted to keep its interest costs as low as possible.  
 Then, in July 1950, the Korean War broke out. When the Chinese invaded Korea 
in December, the prospect seemed to be new, large budget deficits that would fuel 
inflation. Compromises were no longer possible. The System had to have the power to act. 
Treasury, however, did not budge, in fact overplaying its hand. On January 31, 1951, a 
unique, but also decisive meeting took place at the White House between the FOMC and 
President Truman, who was a strong supporter of the Treasury’s views. The impetus for 
the meeting was a speech delivered by Secretary Snyder two weeks before. In that speech, 
he had stated that the System unconditionally supported maintaining the interest rate at 
2.5%. After the meeting, the White House and the Treasury announced that the System 
fully supported the views of the Treasury and that there were no differences of opinion. 
This was counter to the facts. Asked by reporters if the System had capitulated, Eccles 
denied it. When the White House published a letter in which the President thanked 
Chairman Thomas McCabe for his support of the Treasury, Eccles saw no other option 
than to leak to the press a report of the White House meeting that the FOMC had 
prepared. The report stated clearly that the President had not asked the FOMC to support 
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the policy of the Treasury and the FOMC had in fact, not given that support. This 
document exposed the White House and the Treasury as liars. Eccles’s action forced a 
breakthrough. Within a month, there was an agreement that liberated the System from the 
shackles of the Treasury. A few months after he had freed the System from its 
“Babylonian Captivity,” Eccles resigned and returned to Utah.197  
 The System had gained independence from the Treasury. Was the Federal 
Reserve System now similar to other government agencies that had to implement the 
policies agreed upon by the President and Congress? Had it gained independence within 
the government, as Alan Sproul has said?
198
 Using the term “interdependency”, Donald 
Kettle, calls the independence of the Federal Reserve System unique, even if it is not total. 
In contrast to other government agencies, it is self-financing, thus free from congressional 
appropriation troubles. A public board controls privately owned reserve banks. Members 
of the Board enjoy long terms, and there are no formal relations between the President of 
the United States and the Board of the Federal Reserve System. That does not mean, 
however, that a President has no influence at all on the System’s policies. The days that a 
President like Herbert Hoover did not dare to order or ask the System to support his 
policies are over. As Kettle argues, monetary and fiscal policies are now related. The 
System’s monetary decisions really matter to the President. The Depression destroyed the 
premise of the founders that monetary policy could be set independently from the 
government’s policies. Monetary policy today is part of the President’s economic strategy.  
 Another major reason is that the federal budget has lost its power to steer the 
economy. A very small part of the budget, less than 10%, today, is not mandated by 
existing laws and thus controllable. Nevertheless, the voters just expect from a President 
that he is taking care of the economy. Furthermore, since the 1980s due to Globalization, 
the System is an institution that operates internationally. Therefore, Kettle concludes, 
“The Fed and the presidency, the chairman and the president, are thus inextricably 
interdependent.”199                
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 Today, the Federal Reserve System is a powerful, possibly the most powerful, 
institution of the United States. As Shull argues, it “presides over the full scope of the 
nation’s monetary affairs … with the well-known aims of stabilizing prices and 
promoting economic growth.” It supervises and regulates banking organizations, has the 
authority to approve or disapprove mergers between banks, and the capacity to bail out 
failing banks. It leads in developing regulations in international banking, operates and 
regulates payment systems and develops rules regarding consumer credit. All of these 
important functions give the Chair of the Federal Reserve System an intense level of 
visibility. When he or, as is the case today, she gives legally required testimony before 
the Senate, the entire financial world listens carefully.
200
  
 According to Shull, the power of the System grew out of three economically 
turbulent periods. The first was immediately after the First World War, when the System 
developed open market transactions as a tool of financial policy. The second was during 
the Depression when Eccles reorganized the System, placing the decisive authority for 
open market transactions in the Board. The 1970s was the third period. It was the years of 
stagflation, which in contrast to economic theory saw a combination of high inflation and 
high unemployment. It was the years of the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreements, 
the floating exchange rate of the dollar and exploding oil prices. In all three periods, the 
System had strong leaders, Benjamin Strong, Marriner Eccles and Paul Volcker.
201
 
 Of those three periods, the second is the most important. The depression era 
placed the Federal Reserve System in the position to act counter-cyclically, or as William 
McChesney Martin, chairman from 1951 to 1970, said, leaning against the winds or 
taking the punch bowl away as the party gets going.
202
 Only when the Accord of 1951 
freed the System from the Treasury could it play that role, and the Federal Reserve 
System stepped right up to do it. Liberals reprimanded Martin that his policy to curb 
inflation smothered economic growth. Paul Volcker wrung the rampaging inflation out of 
the economy through implementing higher discount rates than ever before. In 2008, when 
the worst recession since the 1930s threatened to result in deflation once again, the 
Federal Reserve System did what, according to Galbraith, it should have done in the 
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1929-1933: flood the economy with money through a program of “quantitative easing.” 
The Federal Reserve bought government securities on a massive scale. In this case, the 
Federal Reserve System again was correcting for a failure of its own making. According 
to several economists, the System had failed to regulate properly new financial 
instruments, which banks and other financial institutions had invented in 1990s, and now 
it was compensating for this failure.                   
 Not everyone applauds the great power the System now has. Shull finds it ironic 
that an institution that was established in 1913 as a counterweight to concentrations of 
power became what it was meant to supplant.
203
 Greider argued 30 years ago that the 
Federal Reserve was running the country, stating it had become a Secret Temple with its 
own rituals and incomprehensible language. Greider thought that people had forgotten 
that “money was politics and democracy depended on it.”204       
 In the epilogue of The Fiscal Revolution in America Stein distinguishes four steps 
that might allow one to call what happened after 1933 a revolution. First, the balanced 
budget doctrine lost its doctrinal power. President Roosevelt ran deficits – sometimes 
large ones – and nothing happened. The country did no go bankrupt. It did not hurt the 
President at the polls; the voters sent him back to the White House three times. Second, in 
1938, the President took the important decision to commit the government to “a policy of 
managing the overall performance of the economy.” Economic stability became the most 
important objective of fiscal policy at all times, not just in times of crisis. Third, 
“compensatory finance” became standard doctrine when the Eisenhower Administration 
embraced it, “confirming that Republicans as well as Democrats, conservatives as well as 
liberals would henceforth discuss and take decisions with major attention to their 
expected effects on the overall behavior of the economy.” The fourth factor was that no 
other rule or doctrine replaced the budget balancing doctrine.
205
 
 Without naming him, Stein erects a monument for Eccles. It was Eccles who 
vigorously attacked the balanced budget doctrine. It was Eccles who as one of the leaders 
of the group of dedicated deficit spenders convinced President Roosevelt to take a new 
course in 1938. Stein’s epilogue is a clear testimony of Eccles’s legacy on fiscal policy. 
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By introducing “Keynesian” principles as the basis for fiscal policies, Eccles established 
the idea that the government must play an activist role in the economy.  
 For about 40 years, Keynesian principles had a heavy, dominating influence on 
fiscal and economic policies of the federal government, with its high point coming in the 
1960s, when President Nixon thought, “We were all Keynesians.” Then those principles 
began to fall into disrepute. Jeffry Frieden agrees with Kettle that managing the economy 
through fiscal policies and governmental involvement lost its appeal after 1970.
206
 The 
Subprime Recession of 2008, however, testifies that deficit spending as a tool to revive 
the economy certainly is not dead. The Troubled Asset Relief Program, the federal take-
over of the mortgage institutions Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac, and even the temporary 
nationalization of General Motors, showed how big the temptation for and the pressure 
on the federal government were, in a time of crisis, to spend hundreds of billions to save 
the economy. 
 Furthermore, in 2008, the FOMC made price stability and full employment part of 
its policy directives. Eccles would have rejoiced. He had not succeeded in inserting these 
goals in the Banking Act of 1935. However, through the Fair Employment Act of 1946, 
Congress made it mandatory for the federal government to pursue maximum employment 
and production and to maximize purchasing power. More explicitly in 1978, Congress 
passed the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, and that made price stability and 
full employment a national economic objective.
207
 The Federal Reserve did in fact have, 
after 1946, a dual mandate, but it fully acknowledged that only in the crisis of 2008. It 
has not only to control inflation but also to maintain full employment. This 
“quintessential Keynesian understanding … was one of the most revolutionary aspects of 
the institutional transformations of the 1930s.”208  
 The measures taken to combat the subprime crisis of 2008 and the formal 
recognition of its dual mandate in 2008 by the System make it clear that an economic 
policy without taking into consideration “Keynes” is no longer possible. That is the 
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Keynesian side of Eccles’s legacy. Confirming this in May 2014, Utah Senator Orrin 
Hatch unveiled a statue of Marriner Eccles, stating that ”perhaps no Utahn contributed 
more to our Nation’s economic success at such a critical time.”209 He did this in the same 
building in Washington D.C. which 70 years after President Wilson signed the Federal 
Reserve Act into law was renamed in Eccles’s honor in 1983 by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System. Thus, celebrating Eccles as one of the two chairmen who 
“had made a great impact on how the Federal Reserve worked and (who) embodied its 
spirit,” the Federal Reserve System confirmed the other side of Eccles’s legacy.210 His 
significance was now carved in stone and cast in bronze, sealing that Marriner S. Eccles 
was “an example of the very best this country could ever produce.”211 
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands/Summary in Dutch 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt benoemde in het najaar van 1934 Marriner S. Eccles, 
mormoon, miljonair, Republikein en eigenaar van vele bedrijven, ook banken, in Utah, 
tot “Governor”, voorzitter van de Board, het Bestuur van de Federal Reserve System 
(FED). De FED is een instituut dat vergelijkbaar is met de centrale banken van Nederland, 
Frankrijk of Groot-Brittannië. Een belangrijk verschil is dat de Europese centrale banken 
volledig eigendom zijn van de staat, terwijl de FED een samenwerkingsverband is van de 
Federale overheid en 12 regionale private banken. Een betere vergelijking is met de 
Europese Centrale Bank. Dat is ook een samenwerkingsverband van regionale centrale 
banken, die echter wel eigendom van de staat zijn. 
 Eccles accepteerde zijn benoeming onder de voorwaarde, dat hij de FED drastisch 
mocht hervormen. Evenals vermaarde economen, bij voorbeeld Milton Friedman en John 
Kenneth Galbraith was Eccles van mening, dat de Depressie die begon in 1929 de schuld 
was van de FED. In 1935 ondertekende President Roosevelt de wet die de FED inderdaad 
drastisch hervormde. De belangrijkste hervorming was dat de feitelijke beslissingsmacht 
bij de “Board of Governors” kwam te liggen. Dat was in de oude organisatie niet het 
geval.  
 Het opmerkelijke was, dat Eccles, hoewel hij primair verantwoordelijk was voor 
het monetaire beleid, begrotingsbeleid zag als de oplossing voor de economische 
problemen van de jaren ‘30. Zonder dat hij naar eigen zeggen ooit iets van hem gelezen 
had, had Eccles dezelfde ideeën als de vermaarde econoom John  M. Keynes. Verhoging 
van overheidsuitgaven, het creëren van grote tekorten op de begroting van de staat waren 
de oplossing. Alle Amerikanen moesten veel meer geld te besteden krijgen. Dat zou de 
economie stimuleren en de werkloosheid zou verdwijnen. Voor Eccles was werkloosheid 
niet alleen een economisch maar ook en vooral een moreel probleem. De verklaring 
daarvoor is zijn mormoonse achtergrond. De mormoonse gemeenschap in Utah was een 
theocratische en egalitaire democratie, waar het als normaal werd ervaren dat de 
“overheid”, dat wil zeggen de Kerk, het recht en de plicht had om de economie te sturen 
en werkgelegenheid te verschaffen aan werklozen via projecten, betaald door de overhead.  
 Deze ideeën verkondigde hij al vanaf 1932. Voor velen was dat toen vloeken in 
de kerk. De overheersende gedachte was dat voor herstel van de economie het juist nodig 
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was om de uitgaven van de staat niet groter te laten zijn dan de inkomsten. Dit is een 
discussie die nooit definitief beslist is. Bewijs daarvoor is de 3% procent norm waaraan 
de landen in de Europese Unie moeten voldoen door uitgaven te beperken en hogere 
inkomsten te verkrijgen door belastingen te verhogen: voor een echte Keynesiaan, bij 
voorbeeld Paul Krugman, een gruwel.  
 Het duurde tot 1938 voor dat President Roosevelt een begroting indiende die op 
de ideeën van Eccles was gebaseerd. Een hevig gevecht met de Minister van Financiën, 
Henry Morgenthau die heilig geloofde in een begroting in evenwicht, was daarvoor nodig.  
 Eccles’ eerste grote verdienste is dat hij door de hervorming in 1935 de weg 
plaveide om de FED uit te laten groeien tot het zeer machtige instituut dat de het vandaag 
de dag is. Wanneer de voorzitter van de FED in het Congress verschijnt om zijn, en 
tegenwoordig haar, visie te geven op de economie en het monetaire beleid luistert de hele 
financiële wereld aandachtig, De andere grote verdienste van Eccles is, dat hij het idee 
dat een overheid een actieve en sturende rol kan en ook moet spelen aanvaardbaar maakte 
als een van de opties voor economisch beleid.  
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Deze thesis is de afronding van mijn studie geschiedenis aan de universiteit van Leiden. 
Ik heb hiermee een ambitie gerealiseerd die ongeveer dertig jaar geleden vorm begon te 
krijgen.  
Van jongs af aan was ik altijd geïnteresseerd in geschiedenis. Opgegroeid in een 
orthodox-protestant gezin las ik geschiedenisboekjes van protestants-christelijke 
schrijvers over de 80-jarige oorlog tegen de wrede katholieke Spanjaarden en de strijd 
van de Boeren in Zuid-Afrika tegen de verderfelijke Engelsen. 
  De Verenigde Staten kwamen in beeld met de verkiezing van John F. Kennedy als 
president. Het was de eerste keer dat ik bewust een verkiezingsstrijd meemaakte. De 
verkiezing van zo een charismatische jonge man en zijn al even charismatische vrouw en 
kleine kinderen joeg een golf van sympathie over West Europa die alleen vergelijkbaar is 
met wat veertig jaar later Barack Obama los maakte. 
Rond 1965 verbleef mijn oom Henk voor een stage in het kader van zijn studie 
economie in een van de vele Springfields in de Verenigde Staten. Hij bracht voor mij mee 
een tekstboek over de geschiedenis van de Verenigde Staten dat op de high schools werd 
gebruikt. 
Vanaf dat moment begon ik meer en meer te lezen over de Verenigde Staten. Op 
een voor mij goede dag ontdekte ik ook Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, hoogleraar 
Amerikanistiek in Leiden. Zijn boeken zoals Voorbeeld in de verte en Triomf en Tragiek 
van de Vrijheid ontstaken bij mij de ambitie om Amerikanistiek te gaan studeren, 
natuurlijk in Leiden. Heel kort heb ik nog overwogen dat te doen naast mijn werk als 
bedijfseconoom bij DSM in Limburg. Dat bleek niet haalbaar. Toen heb ik besloten om 
dat te gaan doen, zodra ik met pensioen zou zijn. In september 2010 begon ik aan mijn 
studie geschiedenis in Leiden. Bij het kiezen van de cursussen liet ik mij leiden door mijn 
belangstelling voor de Verenigde Staten en mijn beroep.
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Nu, ruim vijf jaar later rond ik met deze thesis mijn studie af. Ik heb deze studie 
met veel plezier gedaan. Velen hebben mij, meestal zonder het zelf te weten gestimuleerd 
en geholpen door hun belangstelling te laten blijken. In het bijzonder gaat mijn dank uit 
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naar Marcia Viergever en Michael Strange die mijn conceptteksten lazen en 
verbeteringen suggereerden, de acceptatie waarvan natuurlijk geheel mijn 
verantwoordelijkheid is. Ik dank mijn begeleiders bij mijn bachelor- en mastertheses, 
Chris Quispel en Eduard van de Bilt. Zij boden mij het nodige houvast in mijn zoektocht 
door de massa aan informatie die mede door Internet beschikbaar is over de door mij 
gekozen onderwerpen.  
 Als laatste gaat mijn dank naar mijn vrouw Marijke, van wie ik het geduld wel 
eens erg op de proef stelde, vooral wanneer ik aan een tafel bezaaid met boeken en 
documenten. geconcentreerd en nauwelijks aanspreekbaar mijn werkstukken aan het 
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